29.After this modification in case law, the father of José Adrián filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in October 2002, which was dismissed by the courts. The ruling of the Constitutional Law Chamber of the Supreme Court on March 3, 2003, which dismissed the motion, requires relatives to provide evidence to determine whether a forced disappearance had occurred. The Commission observes that this State approach prevents the petitioners from gaining access to this remedy, because the State passes on the obligation to investigate to the alleged victims. 7 30.To deny access to jurisdiction by means of a writ of habeas corpus, the State claims that the facts cannot be clarified because much time has elapsed since they occurred. In this regard, the IACHR considers that the writ of habeas corpus constitutes an efficient remedy to determine the whereabouts of a person although a long time has elapsed since that person’s disappearance. 8 In this specific case, Salvadoran legislation 9 also provides that the “executing judge” in charge of enforcing the writ of habeas corpus has broad powers to request information from state authorities and individuals, and Article 74 of this law on the “responsibility of officials in the writ of habeas corpus” provides that there is “[n]o authority, court or privileged jurisdiction in this matter.” According to the provisions of the judgment issued on this motion for a writ of habeas corpus, the steps taken by the executing judge were confined to observing whether there was a record of the child’s detention. 10 On the basis of these characteristics and powers, the Commission considers that the Salvadoran State had the mechanisms available to take steps aimed at locating the whereabouts of José Adrián Rochac Hernández by a procedure of habeas corpus, despite the time that has elapsed since his disappearance. 31.As a consequence, the IACHR concludes that the habeas corpus was the suitable remedy in this case and that it was duly exhausted. The IACHR therefore considers that said requirement as provided for in Article 46 of the Inter-American Convention has been met. 32.Despite the above, regarding the ongoing criminal investigation, the Commission concludes that it does not have any information that would enable it to conclude that progress has been made in determining the whereabouts of the child José Adrián Rochac. In this regard, the information provided by both parties to the IACHR establishes that the two inquiries that were made during these proceedings involve requesting information from theAsociación ProBúsqueda on April 10, 2002, and the inquiry conducted on August 28, 2003, in which the investigator and prosecutor in charge of the case went to the place where the petitioner claims the incident took place in order to gather information, which turned out to be fruitless. The IACHR considers that this does not constitute evidence that all the steps needed to locate the whereabouts of the child José Adrián Rochac have been taken, especially since the father of the alleged victim provided names of the persons allegedly responsible for the raid that led to the death of the mother of the alleged victim, in addition to his disappearance, and there is no evidence that they have ever been contacted. The IACHR concludes that the fact that there are current judicial proceedings, demonstrating that there is a legal activity aimed at making progress in the investigation during four years, provides grounds for the exception envisaged in the second part of Article 46.2 of the American Convention. 7 See, I/A Court H.R., Bámaca Velásquez Case. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 152, where the Court establishes that “[I]n cases of forced disappearance, the State's defense cannot rely on the impossibility of the plaintiff to present evidence in the proceedings since, in such cases, it is the State that controls the means to clarify the facts that have occurred in its jurisdiction and, therefore, in practice, it is necessary to rely on the cooperation of the State itself in order to obtain the required evidence.” 8 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 79:“Among the indispensable judicial guarantees, habeas corpus represents the suitable means to guarantee liberty, monitor respect for the life and integrity of persons, and prevent their disappearance or the uncertainty of the whereabouts of their detention, to protect individuals against torture or other cruel treatments or penalties. In this regard, a writ of habeas corpus may be an effective remedy to determine the whereabouts of a person or clarify whether there are grounds for qualifying a situation as undermining personal liberty, although the person for the benefit of whom the request if being filed is no longer in the custody of the State, but has been given to the custody of an individual or although a long period of time has elapsed since the disappearance of a person.” 9 Articles 38 to 40 of the Constitutional Procedures Act of El Salvador. 10 Judgment issued by the Constitutional Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador, of March 3, 2003, in proceedings number 216-2002, of José Adrián Rochac Hernández. 7