12 (2006), as well as in my Separate Opinion (paras. 52-55) in the Case of López-Álvarez v. Honduras (Judgment of Feb. 1, 2006). I also insisted on the extension of the material scope of jus cogens to cover access to justice as well in my Separate Opinions in the cases of Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil (Judgment of Jul. 4, 2006, para. 38(47) of the Opinion), Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile (Judgment of Sep. 26, 2006, paras. 17-25 of the Opinion), La Cantuta v. Peru (Judgment of Nov. 29, 2006, paras. 49-62 of the Opinion), and Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay (Judgment of Sep. 22, 2006, paras. 62-68 of the Opinion).39 42. To my particular pleasure, the Court adopted this view in the Judgment recently rendered in the case of Goiburú et al., wherein it held that "(...) Access to justice is a peremptory norm of international law and, as such, gives rise to obligations erga omnes for the States to adopt all necessary measures (...)" (para. 131). To act consistently with this encouraging evolution of its case law, the Court should have provided the clarification sought by petitioners in paragraph 7(a) of their request for interpretation in this Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees. Given that, to my great dissatisfaction (since, as suggested by this, satisfaction can only last for so long), it did not, I have allowed myself to do so in this Dissenting Opinion. 43. I cannot let this rushed decision of the Court in the Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees end up curbing the encouraging line of case-law evolution into which I have put so much effort over the years. The right to a fair trial cannot be neglected, not even in a Judgment on Interpretation: it is a matter of jus cogens. Any decision knowingly or unconsciously minimizing it will not be dignified with my silence but met with my strongest opposition. VI. Considerations and Final Warnings. 44. It is a duty incumbent upon the Inter-American Court, in the exercise of its adjudicatory functions, to do everything in its power, including in Judgments on Interpretation, to ensure that the relevant provisions of the American Convention produce their own effects, under the principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat (a principle widely supported by international case law), which represents the so-called effet utile (sometimes referred to as the effectiveness principle).40 The object and purpose of a given treaty may also be specified and developed by the parties themselves41 (as in classic treaties) under the effect of certain principles of 39 . All the Opinions referred to above are transcribed in: A.A. Cançado-Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos - Esencia y Trascendencia (Votos en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1991-2006), Mexico, Edit. Porrúa/Universidad Iberoamericana, 2007, pp. 117-868. 40 . Said principle underlies the general rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of both Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (of 1969 and 1986). Cf., in general, e.g., A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, Vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brasil, S.A. Fabris Ed., 1999, pp. 24-28, particularly p. 27; M.K. Yasseen, "L'interprétation des traités d'après la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités", 151 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye (1976) p. 74; J.B. Acosta Estévez and A. Espaliat Larson, La Interpretación en el Derecho Internacional Público y Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Barcelona, PPU, 1990, p. 105, and cf. pp. 105-107. 41 . For a suggestion of a "coordination of interpretations" based on the "agreement of the interested parties,” cf. S. Sur, L'interprétation en Droit international public, Paris, LGDJ, 1974, pp. 392, 397 and 399-402.