15 to the almost unnecessarily frantic rhythm that lately it has imposed upon itself against my opinion - for making decisions in record time. As I have repeatedly expressed to the majority of the Court, I am against sacrificing the complete grounds of its judgments in the name of productivity. I herein repeat my understanding that I do not consider myself a “production agent” (nor a “human resource”), and I cannot accept that the highest value of a Court is its productivity, due to the chronic deficiencies of the American States Organization (ASO) in the allocation of its resources to the Inter-American Human Rights Court and Commission. 42. The Court could and should have devoted more time to the support of the above mentioned prohibition of jus cogens, as it was proceeding until the issue of its transcendental Opinion No. 18 of 2003 (cf. infra). This being the first case of mentally disabled people before this Court (para. 123), it could and should have gone deeper on the matter. Bear in mind that an important legacy of the II World Conference of Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), -of which I participated from the first to the last minute, and even during its preparation process, - laid on the recognition of legitimacy of the concern of the whole international community on the living conditions of the population worldwide, especially of its most vulnerable segments. 197 43. Disabled people (more than 600 million, that is, approximately 10% of the world population) form these most vulnerable segments of the population, and the basic principle of equality and non-discrimination gains transcendental importance regarding those people.198 The Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against People with Disabilities of 1999 grants paramount importance to this principle, repeatedly invoked not only in its preamble199 but also in its operating parts (Articles I(2)(a) e (b), II, III(1), IV(1), V(2) and VI(1) and (5)). However, in this Judgment, the Court refers to it in a way, to my opinion, merely oblique and unsatisfactory (para. 105), when in its own jurisprudence, there are precious elements which could have strengthen its arguments. 44. Thus, in its pioneer and historical Consultative Opinion No. 18 on the Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, (dated September 17, 2003), internationally claimed and ahead of its time, the Court states that the above mentioned principle of equality and non-discrimination: "influences all acts of State power, in any of its manifestations, related to the respect and guarantee of human rights. Said principle can effectively be considered as imperative of general international law, as it is applicable to every State, regardless of being a party or not of a certain international treaty, and generates effects regarding third parties, even individuals. (...) This Court considers that the equality and nondiscrimination principle (...) belongs to the scope of jus cogens (...). Today no legal act which conflicts with that fundamental principle is . A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, vol. I, 2nd. ed., Porto Alegre, S.A. Fabris Ed., 2003, pp. 39, 91-100 and 242-251. 197 . Cf., e.g., G. Quinn and T. Degener et alii, Derechos Humanos y Discapacidad - Uso Actual y Posibilidades Futuras de los Instrumentos de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas en el Contexto de la Discapacidad, N.Y./Geneva, United Nations (doc. HR/PUB/02/1), 2002, pp. 1-202. 198 199 . Consideranda 1, 3 and 5.