B. Other requirements for admissibility a. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 37. One of the requirements set by Article 46 of the American Convention for a case to be admitted is that “the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.” This requirement was introduced to allow states a chance to resolve disputes through the legal and judicial channels provided by their own domestic laws. 38. The State claims, in its communication of December 15, 1994, that the case is inadmissible because the stipulation requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies has not been met. 39. The petitioner, in turn, has invoked the exception to this requirement set forth in Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention, regarding the unwarranted delay in resolving the domestic remedies available in his case: [For 11 years] I have been waiting for a legally correct solution; during that entire time I have seen my human rights systematically violated. I have been appearing before the courts since 1988 in my attempts to end the police pressure that keeps me from living a normal life. [...] My frequent requests for judicial protection have been formally received, but the treatment given to them has been either not effective or patently arbitrary [...] making it virtually impossible to exhaust the domestic remedies. 40. The Commission notes the fact that the situation has changed since the parties gave their statements on this aspect of the case. As of the date of this report’s adoption, all the corresponding judicial proceedings under Argentine law have concluded. 41. One of the reasons for the complexity of this case is the fact that it involves seven trials, each dealing with different issues. For the purpose of assessing compliance with the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies, however, only the ordinary judicial remedies related to the allegedly violated rights are of interest.2 Regarding the alleged arbitrary arrest 42. The petitioner was placed in preventive custody as part of proceedings N 24519, for fraud. In other words, he was detained on the orders of a judge with competence to order such an arrest, a requirement that can be deduced from Article 7 of the Convention. The judge, responsible for National First-Instance Criminal Investigating Court N 39, ordered a dismissal in the petitioner’s favor in October 1988; this ruling was finalized and the case was filed. The petitioner maintains that, “since I was considered the accused and not the complainant, I was legally barred from appealing the dismissal resolution” [emphasis in the original]. The State has made no objection to that claim and, in the interests of procedural economy, the Commission will refrain from further analysis of whether proceedings N 24519 were indeed a suitable remedy for seeking recourse against the accusation. Consequently, the Commission holds that the requirement has been met as regards this aspect of the case. Regarding the alleged torture 2 The information contained in this report is based on the update on the domestic legal proceedings as of July 23, 1999, submitted by the petitioner, and on the relevant parts of the State’s submissions. 6