of this requirement is to ensure that the State in question has the possibility to resolve disputes within its own legal jurisdiction. 67. The parties in the present case dispute whether or not the remedies available under domestic law were exhausted. The State alleges that the petition is inadmissible because the petitioner neither lodged nor exhausted an extraordinary constitutional appeal in the Constitutional Court. The petitioner, for his part, indicates that he exhausted all the necessary remedies. The petitioner claims that the judgment contained in Resolution 514/06 from the First Criminal Court of the Superior Court of Justice of La Paz on August 23, 2006 which resolved the secondary appeal lodged against Resolution 13/06 and confirmed the extinguishment of criminal action, constituted the definitive judgment in the case. He also states that on September 20, 2006, Edgar Torrico requested the Fourth Technical Sentencing Court to implement Resolution 13/06, to which he says the response was as follows: “The resolution is final as disposed by law, and needs no express writ of execution.” Therefore he claims that there remains no further remedy to be exhausted in the domestic jurisdiction. 68. The petitioner also claims that there is not a single case among the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Bolivia that by means of an amparo action has declared null the extinguishment of a criminal action because of a due process violation. 69. It is appropriate at this point of the examination to clarify which are the remedies in domestic law that should be exhausted in each particular case. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated that only those remedies capable of remedying the violations that are alleged to have been committed must be exhausted. For a remedy to be capable means that: Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance. If a remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it obviously need not be exhausted. A norm is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted in such a way as to negate its effect or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.11 70. The Commission has also stated that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies available under domestic law does not mean that the alleged victim is obliged to exhaust all the remedies that are available. The Court, as well as the Commission, has stated on many occasions the “(…) the rule that requires the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is designed for the benefit of the State, for that rule seeks to excuse the State from having to respond to charges before an international body for acts imputed to it before it has had the opportunity to remedy them by internal means.”12 Consequently, if the alleged victim lodged her case with one of the valid and adequate alternatives in the domestic jurisdiction and the State had the opportunity of remedying the matter by internal means, the aim of the international norm would have been observed.13 71. In view of the parties’ position regarding exhaustion of remedies, the Commission observes that the petitioner opted to resort to criminal proceedings. In the criminal proceedings, the petitioner claims that the decision contained in Resolution 514/06 of the First Criminal Court of the Superior Court of Justice of La Paz on August 23, 2006, which resolved the secondary appeal and confirmed the extinguishment of the criminal case resolved by the Fourth Sentencing Court (see reasoning paragraph 38, supra) constitutes the definitive judgment in the case. The Commission observes that the First Criminal Court of the Superior Court of Justice of La Paz confirmed that the delay in the criminal process was due to causes directly attributable to the administration of Bolivian justice because it had twice incurred nullity because of procedural failings: I/A Court H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C, No. 4, paragraph 64. I/A Court H.R., In the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. Series A, No. G, 101/81, paragraph 26. 13 IACHR, Report No. 57/03, Admissibility, petition 12,337, Marcela Andrea Valdés Díaz (Chile), October 10, 2003, paragraph 40. 11 12 11