-27through the common intervener, a single pleading containing the petitions and arguments on behalf of all the groups of representatives appointed in the application. Likewise, the Court stated that “[i]n the case of the alleged victims who do not or may not have a representative, the Commission should safeguard their interests so as to ensure that they are effectively represented throughout all procedural stages before the Court.” 143. Therefore, the representation of the interests of the alleged victims in the instant case has been exercised by the Inter-American Commission, by the common intervener, and by other groups of representatives, who have been able to submit their arguments and evidence through the Inter-American Commission. Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the appointment of a legal representative in the proceeding before this Court is a right and not an obligation of the alleged victims.10 144. On this matter the Court has established that: The foregoing Article 23 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, which regulates the participation of the alleged victims in the Court proceedings as from the admission of the application, contains one of the most important regulatory amendments introduced by the Rules and adopted on November 24, 2000, and which came into effect as of June 1, 2001. This rule recognizes the right of the alleged victims and their next of kin to participate autonomously throughout the proceedings. The previous Rules of Procedure did not recognize the alleged victims and their next of kin such an extensive legal standing. The Court may not construe the above Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure as restricting the rights of the alleged victims and their next of kin and cease hearing the case when they do not have a duly accredited representative.11 145. Likewise, the Court has stated that it is not essential that the power of attorney granted by the alleged victims to be represented in the proceeding before the Court conform to the same formalities established by the domestic laws of the respondent State.12 The Court has further stated that: The usual practice of this Court as regards to the representation rules has been governed by [such parameters] and, therefore, has been flexible and has been broadly applied […]. […] This latitude in accepting the representation instruments has, however, certain limits dictated by the use which the representation itself will have. First, the instruments must clearly identify the party bestowing the power of attorney and reflect a lucid and unambiguous manifestation of free will. They must also name the person to whom the power of attorney is granted and, finally they must specifically state the purpose of the representation. In the opinion of this Court,, the instruments that meet these requirements are valid and have full effect once submitted before the Court .13 10 Cf. Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 6, para. 86. 11 Cf Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 6, para. 85. 12 Cf. Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 6, para. 94; Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru. Reparations (art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Judgement of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, paras. 65 and 66; and Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations (art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, paras. 97, 98 and 99. 13 Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 6, para. 94. Furthermore cf. Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru. Reparations, supra note 12, paras. 65 and 66; and Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations, supra note 12, paras. 97 and 99.