22 91. The inter-American human rights system has asserted that the State’s obligation to act with due diligence in cases of human rights violations also applies, under certain circumstances, to the actions of non-state actors, third parties or private parties. The Court has emphasized that: [s]aid international responsibility may also be generated by acts of private individuals not attributable in principle to the State. The States Party to the Convention have erga omnes obligations to respect protective provisions and to ensure the effectiveness of the rights set forth therein under any circumstances and regarding all persons. The effect of these obligations of the State goes beyond the relationship between its agents and the persons under its jurisdiction, as it is also reflected in the positive obligation of the State to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure effective protection of human rights in relations amongst individuals. The State may be found responsible for acts by private individuals in cases in which, through actions or omissions by its agents when they are in the position of guarantors, the State does not fulfill these erga 79 omnes obligations embodied in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. 92. The Court has also written that: a State cannot be responsible for all the human rights violations committed between individuals within its jurisdiction. Indeed, the nature erga omnes of the treaty-based guarantee obligations of the States does not imply their unlimited responsibility for all acts or deeds of individuals, because its obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by the awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and to the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. In other words, even though an act, omission or deed of an individual has the legal consequence of violating the specific human rights of another individual, this is not automatically attributable to the State, because the specific circumstances of the case and the execution of these guarantee obligations must be 80 considered. 93. In order to determine whether the acts of third parties can be deemed violations for which the State bears international responsibility, the Court has cited the jurisprudence of the European Court, which suggests that a state can be held internationally responsible for violations committed by third parties when it is shown that the State knew of a real and immediate risk and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent it. The Inter-American Court cited the jurisprudence of the European Court, which is that: Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 79 I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 111, par. 80 par. 123. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140,