26 also applicable in those areas and, therefore, in this type of matter, the individual also has the overall right to the due process applicable in criminal proceedings. 76 97. The alleged victims argued that their termination was carried out by an incompetent authority, without guarantees of independence or impartiality, without a prior procedure established by law, without the possibility of being heard, of hearing the charges made against them, or of defending themselves. In addition, they argued that the second vote of impeachment was done without respecting due process guarantees. For its part, the State argued that neither due process guarantees nor the principle of legality applies, for they were not sanctioned for any infraction; rather, all that was done was to apply “termination” (“cesación”) to them. 98. The IACHR will analyze the arguments of the parties as follows: i) Analysis whether the rights enshrined in Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention are applicable to the alleged victims; ii) Analysis whether the State incurred in a violation of the rights established in Article 9 of the Convention; and iii) Analysis whether the State incurred in a violation of the rights established in Article 8 of the Convention 1. Analysis whether the rights enshrined in Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention are applicable to the alleged victims 99. The Commission believes it must first of all address the Ecuadorian State’s argument that the victims were not entitled to the guarantees of freedom from ex post facto laws and due process, in that their functions were terminated but they were not removed or dismissed from their positions under a disciplinary sanction. 100. First, given that the Constitution of Ecuador and the Organic Law on the Legislative Function expressly establish impeachment proceedings as the mechanism for removal of judges, it is not possible to understand the nature of the resolution issued by the National Congress on November 25, 2004. In addition, this type of resolution is not provided for in the normative framework, nor does it clearly state its intent or aim, although in this case, a sort of implicit sanction appears to be imposed on judicial officers in retaliation for the way they have performed the judicial function. 101. The transcript of the legislative debate of November 25, 2004, contains a series of assessments of the action of the members of the Constitutional Court, and what was described as its politicization. 77 Moreover, in the course of the hearing on the merits held during the 131st period of sessions of the IACHR, the State indicated that at the time of the events, it was publicly known that the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court depended on a political power and a political party that dominated among the government authorities 78 and that termination “obviously requires the verification of an infraction, committing a regulatory or statutory infraction that would lay the foundation for … the prosecution, trial of the person involved, and his or her subsequent removal.” 79 In view of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the action of the Congress was not exclusively aimed at reviewing the procedural mechanism applied to appoint the judges and that was in the nature of a sanction. 76 I/A Court H. R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C No. 71. para. 70. 77 Annex 27. News clippings produced as an annex to the petitioners’ initial petition. 78 Annex 28. IACHR. Public hearing held March 10, 2008, during the 131st regular period of sessions, Case 12,597. Miguel Camba Campos et al. (Judges of the Constitutional Court). Audio available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/prensa/publichearings/advanced.aspx?Lang=ES. 79 Annex 28. IACHR. Public hearing held March 10, 2008, during the 131st regular period of sessions. Case 12,597. Miguel Camba Campos et al. (Judges of the Constitutional Court). Audio available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/prensa/publichearings/advanced.aspx?Lang=ES.