58 Republic, “were necessarily important in a democratic society, working towards a participative and pluralist power structure, a matter of public interest.” 94. In this case, when making the statements for which he was sued, Mr. Canese was exercising his right to freedom of thought and expression in the context of an electoral campaign, with regard to a presidential candidate who is a public figure, on matters of public interest, by questioning the competence and suitability of a candidate to assume the presidency of the Republic. During the electoral campaign, Mr. Canese, as a presidential candidate, was interviewed about the candidacy of Mr. Wasmosy by journalists from two national newspapers. When publishing Mr. Canese’s declarations, the newspapers “ABC Color” and “Noticias” played an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of freedom of thought and expression,127 because they sought and transmitted to the electorate the opinion of one of the presidential candidates about another, which ensured that the electoral had more information and different opinions before it took a decision. 4) Restrictions to freedom of thought and expression allowed in a democratic society 95. The Court considers that is it important to underscore, as in previous cases, that the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute right, but may be restricted, as established in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 13 of the Convention and in Article 30 thereof. Moreover, in paragraph 2 of the said Article 13, the American Convention indicates the possibility of establishing restrictions to freedom of expression through the subsequent imposition of liability in cases of an abusive use of this right. However, this should in no way limit, more than strictly necessary, the full scope of freedom of expression and become a direct or indirect means of prior censorship. 96. Owing to the circumstance of the instant case, the Court considers it necessary to examine in detail whether, in order to impose subsequent liability on Mr. Canese for his statements, the requirement of necessity in a democratic society is met.128 The Court has indicated that the “necessity” and, hence, the legality of restrictions imposed on freedom of expression under Article 13(2) of the American Convention, depend upon showing that the restrictions are required by a compelling public interest. If there are various options to achieve this objective, the one which least restricts the protected right should be selected. Given this standard, it is not enough, for example, to demonstrate that a law performs a useful or desirable purpose; to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by reference to collective purposes which, owing to their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right that Article 13 guarantees and do not limit the right established in this Article more than is strictly necessary. In other words, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to accomplishing this legitimate objective, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression.129 127 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 15, para. 117; and Case of Ivcher-Bronstein, supra note 114, para. 149. 128 129 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 15, para. 120. Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 15, paras. 121 and 123; Compulsory Membership in an Association prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 114, para. 46; see also Eur. Court H. R., Case of The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra note 120, para. 59; and Eur. Court H. R., Case of Barthold v. Germany, supra note 120, para. 59.