67 708 of this Code stipulated that, “[i]n cases of libel or injuria, the detention or preventive detention of the defendant shall never be ordered, unless there are grounds for presuming that he will try to abandon the country.” Hence, as indicated by the State in its arguments (supra para. 112(a)), the 1890 Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide any alternative precautionary measure to preventive detention or detention. 127. In this respect, Paraguay indicated that “when denying [permission to leave national territory], it was acting in accordance with [the ...] 1890 Code of Criminal Procedure [...] and none of its provisions established alternate or substitute measures to preventive detention that would have a less onerous effect on the quality of life of those accused of punishable acts. This was only rectified by the adoption and implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedure or Act No. 1286/98” (supra para. 112(a)). 128. Based on these considerations, the Court concludes that a restriction to leave the country was imposed on Mr. Canese as a precautionary measure in relation to the criminal proceedings filed against him; and, since it was not regulated by law, it failed to comply with the requirement of legality necessary for the restriction to be compatible with Article 22(3) of the Convention. b) Requirement of necessity in a democratic society 129. Having examined the legality of the restriction, the Court considers it essential to stress that precautionary measures affecting personal freedom and the freedom of movement of the defendant are of an exceptional nature, because they are limited by the right to presumption of innocence and the principles of necessity and proportionality, essential in a democratic society. International case law and comparative criminal legislation agree that, in order to apply such precautionary measures during criminal proceedings, there must be sufficient evidence to reasonably suppose the guilt of the defendant and the presence of one of the following situations: danger that the defendant will abscond; danger that the defendant will obstruct the investigation; and danger that the defendant will commit an offense – and the latter is currently under discussion. Also, these precautionary measures may not constitute a substitute for imprisonment or fulfill the purposes of the latter; as can happen, if they continue to be applied, when they have ceased to fulfill the functions mentioned above. Otherwise, the application of a precautionary measure affecting the personal freedom and freedom of movement of the defendant would be tantamount to anticipating a sentence, which is at odds with universally recognized general principles of law.140 130. In the instant case, the first judicial decision in which Mr. Canese was not authorized to leave the country was issued on April 29, 1994 (supra para. 69(53)), approximately one month after the judgment of first instance had been delivered. The Court observes that, with regard to the requirement of necessity in a democratic society, the State indicated that the restriction of freedom of movement imposed on Mr. Canese sought “to ensure that the wrongdoer remained subject to the proceedings” (supra para. 112(a)), which would appear to indicate that the restriction was imposed on the alleged victim for almost eight years and four months because the judicial authorities considered there was a danger that Mr. Canese would abscond. 140 Cf. Case of Suárez-Rosero. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77.