72 notified – which obliged the Supreme Court of Justice to deliver a decision that the legal action had lapsed owing to its abandon, almost three years after the respective action had been filed.” Mr. Canese’s lawyers had already been prejudiced by the closure of the evidentiary stage of the proceeding, “because they had not pressed for a [decision] on the steps taken and had not requested the time for submitting evidence to be extended; a measure that corresponded to them because they had offered evidence.” This negligence was repeated on several occasions during the proceedings; f) “The Paraguayan State could be found accountable for its obligation to decide the legal situation of [Mr.] Canese[,] since [the action] was processed under a procedural norm that led to a vitiated proceeding[,] because it did not respect the minimum standards that should be enjoyed by anyone accused of committing a punishable act, and who has not been convicted owing to measures he has taken [...], to ensure that individuals accused of punishable acts enjoy all the rights and guarantees established in the international human rights system; g) It is possible that “… [Mr.] Canese’s case –regulated by the old procedure– was one of those delayed beyond the minimum parameters established in the American Convention; although it is not possible to attribute this to the bodies of the Paraguayan State, which, in the midst of the crisis, ha[ve] been able to overcome such problems and implement the new penal model –in form and content;” h) “Even though the Paraguayan State […] may be accountable for the delay in the final decision in the proceedings against [Mr.] Canese,” the following considerations should be taken into account when examining the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention: the criminal proceedings to which Mr. Canese was subjected was regulated by a norm of an investigative nature; the criminal proceedings were of a private nature; in other words, “it would not have been appropriate for [the State] to expedite the proceedings de oficio; [and …], on several occasions, [Mr.] Canese’s representatives acted inadequately by making time-barred submissions or through lack of procedural activity.” In this respect, “the Paraguayan State cannot be attributed with all the responsibility for the time consumed to obtain a final decision in the case; on this point, the Court should therefore decide to reject the claim;” i) Mr. Canese was given all the guarantees of due process for his defense; however, the procedural actions undertaken by his defense lawyers were not the “most appropriate”, but, to the contrary, negligent. Nevertheless, the State absolved him of all guilt and pardoned him for the offenses of slander and injuria in decision and judgment No. 1362 delivered by the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay on December 11, 2002; j) Regarding the restriction to leave the country, Mr. Canese was subjected to “a precautionary measure of a personal nature [...] following a request he made to abandon the country, which was opposed in the private dispute, after the judgment of first instance convicting him had been delivered.” In the Paraguayan criminal justice system, the measure restricting departure from the country is “a frequent precautionary measure and does not harm any right;”