7 convicted inmates were housed separately from those who had not been convicted; and d) with regard to the investigation into the facts that necessitated adoption of the provisional measures so as to identify those responsible and punish them accordingly, which includes the investigation into the serious events that occurred subsequent to the Court’s issuance of its June 18 and August 29, 2002 orders and more than two years after the deaths that occurred in 2002, the State merely reported that it has again requested the Prosecutor’s Office to investigate those deaths; however, “it does not report whether any investigation has been instituted or what the current status of the requested investigation is”; 19. The May 18, 2004 brief in which the petitioners presented their observations on the State’s sixth report of May 4, 2004 (supra ‘Having Seen’ 17). Summarizing, the petitioners pointed out that: a) the State did not act with due diligence when the April 2004 riot broke out. It was not until 24 hours after the start of the uprising that the Government of the State of Rondônia designated a coordinator for the Crisis Management Team. This shows that the local government is not prepared to take the lead in dealing with a riot about which it was warned by the petitioners several months earlier, and then by the press and relatives of the inmates. According to the petitioners, the presence of the Director of the DEPEN was essential in bringing about an end to the riot. However, “the help came very late; 14 inmates had [already] been executed and more than half the area under construction at Urso Branco Prison had been destroyed.” Concerning the hostages, when the riot ended, representatives of the Justice and Peace Commission spoke with the women who had been taken hostage. According to the petitioners, “[m]any of them” said they were not hostages; instead, they were collaborating with the inmates, as they did not approve of the treatment the inmates were given;“[o]ther women” stated that they were threatened that if they left the prison their relatives would be the first to die; b) the measures Brazil has taken “are not an energetic and effective solution” to the very grave situation at Urso Branco prison, as they cannot provide immediate and effective protection for the lives and personal safety of the prisoners and other persons inside the prison, such as prison guards and visitors. The petitioners allege that no concrete measures are being taken to reduce the extreme tension between the inmates and the State agents working in the prison; the petitioners cannot identify any effective measures being taken to adjust conditions at the prison to conform to the relevant international standards for the protection of human rights; c) as for the situation at the prison in the wake of the riot, a number of inmates were transferred to other prisons and 30 inmates were selected by the other inmates to form “free cells,” working outside the cells on cleaning. The prisoners designated as “free cells” were the very same prisoners who led the riot. According to the petitioners, between April 23 and May 4, 2004, not a single military police officer or prison guard entered the cellblock area, which remained under the control of the inmates. Effective April 28, 2004, the number of military police was reduced from 100 to 30, thereby making it even more difficult for any prison personnel operating inside the cellblocks to