-10mechanisms, it is better to choose the most effective means and leave academic pretensions to one side. 31. Thus, in this judgment, the Court decided to examine Talía Gonzales Lluy’s health problems as a persons living with HIV under the rights to life and to personal integrity recognized in Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention. The fact that the Court chose to argue the case in this way, did not prevent it from making important progress as regards the requirements of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality in the provision of health care services, as well as the obligation to regulate, monitor and supervise the provision of services in private health care centers. This does not entail the creation of a new right, but merely provides content and scope to rights such as to life and to integrity that are recognized in the Convention and, therefore, accepted by the States Parties. 32. Furthermore, another of my concerns is that expanding the Court’s competence, in disregard of the will of the States, delegitimizes the Court and calls into question the progress made, with considerable effort, on other issues in its case law. The legitimacy of the courts stems, in the first place, from the will of the States that decided to establish them, as well as from their judgments, the reasoning that they present in those judgments, and their adherence to the law. If the Court exceeds the functions assigned to it under the American Convention and other treaties of the inter-American system, it would be undermining the legitimacy and confidence that the States have deposited in it. A decision that involved disregarding the will of the States on this point could give rise to a negative reaction or displeasure that jeopardizes the system. Even though the Court was not established to please the States, because its mandate is to rule on their international responsibility, it should not create an imbalance that could lead to a lack of protection for the human rights that it seeks to safeguard. In this regard, I agree that: “A Court interpretation of the scope of article 26 that would permit direct access for ESC violations could constitute either broadening of the jurisdiction, or expansion of the "opportunities to detect, expose or remedy noncompliance” - in either case, results likely to produce hostile state reaction. Again, in both cases, a given state's hostility would flow primarily from its belief that the supranational body is engaging in more or a different kind of oversight than the state initially accepted. In this model, state perception is more important than the correctness (to the extent that this may be judged objectively) of the supranational decision. If, as we argue, states understand the terms of the American Convention and the Court's rulings in Five Pensioners and subsequent cases as limits on direct access for ESC litigation via article 26, a broader interpretation of that article by the Court would constitute overlegalization.”27 33. Lastly, I consider that human rights courts, such as the Inter-American Court, cannot try and make up for the democratic deficiencies of the countries, and should therefore exercise caution in this regard. 28 Human rights courts should seek to protect the rights of minorities, but based always on the competences that have been assigned to them. The stability and future of the inter-American system depends to a great extent on the balance that the Court achieves between the temptation to over expand it competences and the need to make progress in legal standards for the effective protection and guarantee of human rights. 27 James L. Cavallaro and Emily Schaffer. Rejoinder: Justice before Justiciability: Inter-American Litigation and Social Change, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 39, Issue 2 (Winter 2006), p. 365. 28 In this regard, see: “Sin lugar para la soberanía popular. Democracia, derechos and castigo en el caso Gelman. Roberto Gargarella (2012).