risk to Jineth Bedoya’s rights to life, humane treatment, and personal liberty, in violation of Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the American Convention. 96. This lack of protection had an obvious impact on the exercise of other fundamental rights. First, it is an uncontested fact that these acts of violence were carried out in retaliation for Jineth Bedoya’s journalistic work and that she was doing precisely that work when she was deprived of her liberty, beaten, and raped. In fact, during the entire time she was deprived of her liberty and while the beatings and sexual violence occurred, the perpetrators made it clear that they wanted to punish her for her reporting and intimidate her so that she would not continue her work. Colombia had the obligation to protect journalist Jineth Bedoya from the special risk derived from the practice of journalism that was reported to the authorities on several occasions. As the Inter-American Court has recognized in its decisions in the cases of Vélez Restrepo and Family v. Colombia 193 and Carvajal Carvajal et al. v. Colombia, 194 compliance with protection obligations is particularly relevant when the violations against the victim were related to the exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression. The failure to comply with this protection obligation prevented the victim from exercising her right to freedom of expression in an environment free from threats, harassment, and violence, and constituted a violation of Article 13 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1. thereof, to the detriment of Jineth Bedoya. 97. Second, the State was under a special obligation to act with due diligence to protect Jineth Bedoya from attacks on her personal safety and acts of sexual violence. The Commission 195 and the InterAmerican Court have held that rape entails the violation of essential aspects of privacy and the denial of the “right to decide freely with whom to have intimate relations, […] and over basic bodily functions.” 196 Along the same lines, on the relationship between violence against women and discrimination, the IACHR has observed that violence against women is a form of discrimination that severely impairs the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing with men. 98. The Commission finds that the sexual violence suffered by Jineth Bedoya is part of the widespread context of sexual violence against women that characterized the Colombian armed conflict and exemplifies the special risks of sexual violence and discrimination to which women journalists are exposed in the practice of their profession because of their gender. The IACHR considers that the State failed in its duty, insofar as the national authorities failed to act to protect the journalist from this type of violence, which constitutes a violation of Articles 5.1, 5.2, 11, and 24 of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations contained in Article 1.1 thereof, Article 7b of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and Articles 1 and 6 of the IACPPT. 99. Third, it is clear from the established facts that as a consequence of the risk faced by Jineth Bedoya and the lack of effective protective measures taken by the State, she was forced to leave the country temporarily in 1999, as a security measure taken by the media outlet where she worked. The threats against her led to significant insecurity and a well-founded fear in the journalist that her rights to life and humane treatment were at risk of being violated if she remained in Colombia. The bodies of the inter-American system have established in several matters that the right of movement and residence, protected under Article 22.1 of the American Convention, is an indispensable condition for the free development of the person, and includes, inter alia, the right of those who are legally within a State to move freely within it as well as to choose their place of residence. This right can be violated by de facto restrictions when the State has failed to create the conditions for exercising it. Such de facto restrictions may occur when a person is the victim of threats or harassment and the State does not provide the necessary guarantees to enable him or her to move and reside I/A Court H.R. Case of Vélez Restrepo and Family v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C, No. 248. 194 I/A Court H.R. Case of Carvajal Carvajal et al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 13, 2018. 195 IACHR. Report 5/96. Case 10.970. Peru. Raquel Martín de Mejía. March 1, 1996. 196 I/A Court H.R. Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparation and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2010. Series C, No. 216, para. 119; I/A Court H.R. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010, Series C, No. 215, para. 129, citing European Court of Human Rights, Case of M.C. v. Bulgaria. Judgment of 4 December 2003, App. No. 39272/98, para. 150, and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case of Mucic et. al. “Celebici Camp”. Judgment of November 16, 1998. Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 492. 193 25