regards strict compliance with the right of defense at all stages of a punitive proceeding, are standalone rights that are not contingent on subjective judgments as to whether or not a particular procedure was "legally relevant." 85. In third place, according to the proven facts, on October 17, 2000, the General Command of the Police ordered a disciplinary tribunal to be convened in order to examine the disciplinary offenses attributed to the alleged victim and it called a public hearing for October 25, 2000. As was mentioned, there is no record of the victim having been given formal notice of that proceeding. In that regard, the State has not managed to refute the alleged victim's claim that he was verbally informed on October 24, 2000, that a hearing on his case would be held the following day in the city of Esmeraldas, an 18-hour bus journey from the province where he was situated, which meant that he had travel all night and find two lawyers to prepare his defense just hours before the hearing was held. The Commission recalls that one of the lawyers requested a continuance of the hearing in order to prepare an adequate defense, but the Disciplinary Tribunal denied his request. 86. The IACHR highlights that the hearing addressed the petitioner's offenses in a general manner and that there was also no clarity at that stage as to the deeds and disciplinary violations that the alleged victim had committed. The Commission notes as a constant throughout the disciplinary proceeding that there was a lack of clarity as to whether the proceeding was instituted because of Mr. Mina Cuero’s alleged assault of his former live-in partner, or because his insolence to his superiors, or both, an aspect that was only elucidated when the Disciplinary Tribunal issued its punitive decision. 87. Based on the foregoing, the IACHR concludes that the State violated Víctor Henry Mina Cuero's right of defense recognized at Articles 8(2)(b), (c), and (d) of the American Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the same instrument. 2. The principle of presumption of innocence41 in relation to the reliance on the criminal record in the dismissal decision 88. The presumption of innocence implies that the accused is legally innocent or not guilty until a decision is made on their criminal responsibility, and therefore the State's treatment of them should be consistent with their status as a person who has not been convicted.42 The Court has held that this means that the defendant does not have to prove that he did not commit the offense with which he is charged, because the onus probandi is on those making the accusation.43 Thus, the convincing demonstration of guilt is an essential requirement for a criminal sanction, so that the burden of proof falls on the prosecutor and not on the accused.44 89. At the same time, the principle of presumption of innocence means that the judge should not initiate the proceeding with a preconceived notion that the defendant has committed the offense with which they are charged The IACHR has stated that the application of a penalty may only be founded upon the court’s certainty regarding the existence of a punishable act attributable to the accused.45 The Commission has also held that to impose a disciplinary penalty on someone based purely on the existence of a criminal charge against violates the principle of presumption of innocence because it implies considering a priori that the accused is guilty as charged. 90. In the instant case, the Commission notes that, according to the record of the public hearing, the president of the Disciplinary Tribunal ordered the alleged victim's employment record to be read out, revealing that he had four disciplinary sanctions on his professional record, that he undergone criminal prosecution for homicide, the case for which was provisionally dismissed, and that he had been discharged by judgment of the Disciplinary Tribunal, but reinstated based on a ruling of the Constitutional Court. In addition, 41 Article 8(2) of the American Convention provides: Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. 42 I/A Court H.R., Case of Ruano Torres et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 303, par. 126. 43 I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, par. 154. 44 IACHR, Report No. 82/13, Case 12.679, Merits, José Agapito Ruano Torres and Family, El Salvador, November 4, 2013, par. 118. 45 IACHR, Report on the Use of Pretrial Detention in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.46/13, December 30, 2013, par. 132.