SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I have joined in the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the instant Blake case, although I would have preferred the Court to have based its conclusions on a different reasoning. Given the importance of this Judgment on Preliminary Objections, this being the first time that the Court has been called upon to decide on the matter in the special circumstances of the cas d'espèce, and because of its implications for cases of like kind in the future, I shall explain my understanding of the grounds for this decision. My Separate Opinion dwells upon the Court's decision on the first preliminary objection interposed by the Government of Guatemala, since I am satisfied with the Court's decision on the second and third objections, rejected as unfounded for appearing rather as arguments as to the merits. 2. The Court has before it a case of disappearance of a person, since it has been established that the detention and death of Mr. Nicholas Chapman Blake occurred between 28 and 29 March 1985, and his presumed mortal remains (later identified as such by a forensic expert) were only found in June 1992. Since the Court has developed some considerations on the concept of “forced disappearance of persons” (paragraphs 35-39 of the Judgment), may I add a brief general observation, recalling that the term -which comes to be used increasingly since the mid-sixties, gradually passing into the lexicon of the international law of human rights during the next decade,- has only recently been defined as a crime (Article II) by the 1994 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. The international experience on the matter accumulated by human rights supervisory organs in recent years shows that forced disappearance of persons cannot be dissociated from violations of other rights, enshrined in human rights treaties like the American Convention on Human Rights, such as, e.g., the right to personal liberty and security [Article 7(1)], the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment [Article 7(3)], the right not to subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (Article 5), the right to recognition as a person before the law (Article 3). 3. Inasmuch as cases of enforced disappearance have been characterized by the denial of responsibility on the part of the public authorities and the resulting impossibility of obtaining justice and reparation, leading to a situation of impunity and to the defenselessness of the victims, both direct (the “disappeared”) and indirect (their relatives), neither can forced disappearance be dissociated from violations of other rights, also protected in treaties such as the American Convention, namely, e.g., the right to simple and prompt recourse to a competent national court or tribunal (Article 25) and the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal (Article 8). In reality, only after discovery of the whereabouts of a disappeared person has it been possible to determine whether those and other rights have been violated. This we know from the experience on the matter of the international organs of protection of human rights, starting with the need to consider a case of disappearance in an integral manner, comprising its multiple aspects. 4. Since it has been established, at this phase of preliminary objections, in the instant Blake case, that neither party disputes the facts of the detention and death of Mr. Nicholas