59 Court for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICCY") has ruled in the same direction in the case Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, considering that "a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and 276 an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable." 257. In the present case, the Commission observes that the torture and murder of Marino López took place in the context of systematic violence against members of the Cacarica Afro-descendant 277 communities, by the National Army during a military operation and joint operations with paramilitary groups; designed to cause terror to the population. Therefore, the torture and murder of Marino López 278 constitute a crime against humanity . 258. Finally, it is appropriate to state that, with respect to the allegations of a violation of Articles 1 and 8 of the Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, in its Admissibility Report No. 86/06, the Commission declared that "the petitioners' claim is limited to the obligation of ensuring the immediate, ex officio investigation of acts of torture committed against persons under the jurisdiction of the state, pursuant to Articles 1 and 8 thereof. Given the date of the Colombian State's ratification of the Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, determining responsibility for acts of torture or inhumane treatment suffered by the alleged victims in the instant case is covered by Article 5 of the American 279 Convention." 259. Consequently, the Commission concludes that the State is responsible for the extrajudicial execution of Marino López, as well as for the violation of its obligation to adopt the necessary measures to prevent violations and protect his life, in violation of Articles 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1.1. It also concludes that the extrajudicial execution of Marino López was committed in a context of systematic violence against members of the Cacarica Afrodescendant communities, and therefore constitutes a crime against humanity. …continuation Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, paras. 96 to 99 and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 42 and IACHR Report No. 62/08 Manuel Cepeda Vargas, para. 108. 276 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), case Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997, para. 649. This was subsequently confirmed by the same court in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, and others, IT-95-16-T, Judgment of January 14, 2000, para. 550, and Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment of February 26, 2001, para. 178 and I/A Court H.R. Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 42. IACHR Report No. 62/08 Manuel Cepeda Vargas, para. 108. 277 Murder and torture are characterized as crimes against humanity by Article 7.1.a and f of the Statute of the ICC of 1998, whenever committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the members of any civilian population. Rome Statute of the ICC, approved on July 17, 1998, by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9. 278 The term crime against humanity is used throughout the present report in accordance with the criteria established by the Inter-American Court, with the purpose of assessing the legal consequences of alleged violations vis-à-vis the State's obligations. "When examining the merits in cases of serious human rights violations, the Court has taken into account that, if they were committed in the context of massive and systematic or generalized attacks against one sector of the population, such violations can be characterized or classified as crimes against humanity in order to explain clearly the extent of the State's responsibility under the Convention in the specific case, together with the juridical consequences. Hence, the Court in no way attempts to attribute a crime to any natural person. In this regard, the need for comprehensive protection of the individual under the Convention has led the Court to interpret its provisions through their convergence with other norms of international law, particularly with regard to the prohibition of crimes against humanity, which is jus cogens, without this implying that it has exceeded its powers, because, it should be reiterated that, in doing so, it respects the authority of the criminal jurisdiction to investigate, indict and punish the individuals responsible for such crimes. What the Court does, in accordance with treaty-based law and customary law, is to employ the terminology used by other branches of international law in order to assess the legal consequences of the alleged violations vis-à-vis the State's obligations." Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 42. 279 Colombia deposited its instrument of ratification of the Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture on January 19, 1999. IACHR, Report No.86/06, Petition 499-04, Admissibility, Marino López et al. (Operation Genesis) Colombia, October 21, 2006, para. 39.