64 222 they wage. As the Commission observes, this means that the punishable conduct must be formulated in law in clear and unambiguous language; but it also means that legislative or other measures must be taken to ensure that judges can take into account the circumstances of the offenses and of the individual 223 offenders when they deliver a judgment for the commission of terrorist conduct. Along these same lines, the Inter-American Court wrote that: Under the rule of law, the principles of legality and non-retroactivity govern the actions of all the State’s bodies in their respective fields, particularly when the exercise of its punitive power is at 224 issue. . In a democratic system, precautions must be strengthened to ensure that punitive measures are adopted with absolute respect for the basic rights of the individual, and subject to careful 225 verification of whether or not unlawful behavior exists. In this regard, when applying criminal legislation, the judge of the criminal court is obliged to adhere strictly to its provisions and observe the greatest rigor to ensure that the behavior of the defendant corresponds to a specific category of crime, so that he does not punish acts that are not punishable 226 by law.” 232. In the section on the rights to equality before the law and non-discrimination, the Commission concluded that the Chilean court authorities invoked the fact that the victims were either of Mapuche origin or associated with the Mapuche indigenous people to infer that the offenses with which they were charged were committed in the context of a series of acts attributed to a minority group, and on that basis concluded that the conduct could be classified as terrorist offenses. When it held that the decisions taken in these cases were discriminatory, one factor the Commission considered was the fact that the courts failed to properly establish how the conduct attributed to the victims was connected to that minority group. Taking into account the principle of individual criminal responsibility, the Commission finds that the convictions for “terrorist offenses” extrapolated the victims’ terrorist intentions from contextual inferences, which is why the convictions are also incompatible with the principle of individual culpability that underlies contemporary criminal law, and the right to a presumption of innocence, all of which are protected under the American Convention as principles that inform the right to due process and to a fair trial (Article 8 of the Convention) and the rule expressly prohibiting collective criminal responsibility (Article 5 of the Convention). 233. In this regard, in the three convictions analyzed in the instant report the courts made reference to acts committed by third parties before or around the same time as the offenses with which the victims were charged. During the trials a series of witnesses were summoned to testify who described a series of acts unrelated to the victims. Also summoned were witnesses who gave testimony about the alleged fear-inspiring effects of those acts. As the judgments show, the only link between the third-party acts and the victims in the instant case is the ethnic origin of those who reportedly committed 222 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, paragraph 226, and Executive Summary, paragraph 17. 223 In the Commission’s words,“[i]n order to ensure that punishments imposed for crimes relating to terrorism are rational and proportionate, member states are also encouraged to take the legislative or other measures necessary to provide judges with the authority to consider the circumstances of individual offenders and offenses when imposing sentences for terrorist crimes.” IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, Executive Summary, paragraph 17. 224 I/A Court H.R., Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C. No. 115, paragraph 80. Citing Case of Ricardo Canese, supra nota 1, paragraph 177, and Case of Baena Ricardo et al. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, paragraph 107. 225 I/A Court H.R., Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C. No. 115, paragraph 81 Citing: Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra nota 97, paragraph 106; and, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R. Ezelin judgment of 26 April 1991, Series A no. 202, paragraph 45; and Eur. Court H.R. Müller and Others judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, paragraph 29. 226 I/A Court H.R., Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C. No. 115, paragraph 82. See also, I/A Court H.R., Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, Judgment of November 25, 2005 (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C No. 137, paragraphs 187, 189, 190.