69 investigation and trial. The petitioners contend, and the State does not deny, that under this procedural system, much of the investigative phase of the case against Víctor Ancalaf was conducted in secrecy, which posed a significant obstacle for his right of defense, especially inasmuch as he was not given the opportunity to examine the witnesses at the time of their deposition; “ the defense knew nothing of the testimony for months.” 249. The Commission observes that of the evidence that the Court summarized in Consideranda 17 as the basis for its conviction of Víctor Ancalaf for material participation in the attack under investigation, the only testimony that implicated him directly as the author of the truck fire was that given by the two anonymous witnesses. All the other statements refer to meetings held by opponents of the Ralco project or general assessments of Víctor Ancalaf’s conduct; however, they say nothing about the actually perpetration of the attacks. The only pieces of testimony that directly state that Víctor Ancalaf participated in the episode being investigated was that given by “anonymous witness from confidential file No. 3,” “anonymous witness from confidential file No. 5” and the “anonymous witness from confidential file No. 4.” 250. The Commission therefore finds that (a) the restrictions on the defendants’ right of defense were not sufficiently counterbalanced by other measures in the proceedings that would have offset the handicap that the anonymity caused for the defense, and (b) in both instances, the statements made by the anonymous witnesses were decisive in the court’s decision to convict. 251. In the case prosecuted against Pascual Pichún and Aniceto Norín, the Court expressly denied the request from the attorneys representing Pascual Pichún, who wanted to enter evidence to disprove the testimony given by Anonymous Witness No. 1, whose statement was the only one that did not come from one of the alleged victims or the latter’s relatives and that was taken into account to demonstrate Pascual Pichún’s involvement in the crime of terrorist threats. The fact that the identity of the witness was revealed to the defense attorneys but they were prohibited from revealing it to their clients was a substantial drawback in terms of the effectiveness of the cross-examination, since the latter had to be conducted without basic information as to the witness’ motives or suitability, information that only the defendants –not their attorneys- would know. This substantial abridgment of the right of defense was not counterbalanced in the subsequent phases of the trial, especially given the court’s refusal to reveal the identity so that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury, and its refusal to allow new evidence to demonstrate the witness’ lack of credibility. 252. The Court that heard the case against Víctor Ancalaf decided to convict, based almost entirely on the testimony of the anonymous witnesses, who were not cross examined by the defense; these were the only statements that accused Víctor Ancalaf of having participated in the attack on the truck. 253. Given these considerations, the Commission concludes that the Chilean State is responsible for violation of the right recognized in Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations undertaken in articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of Aniceto Norín, Pascual Pichún and Víctor Ancalaf. 3. The right of appeal 3.1 General comments on the right to appeal a court ruling 254. The right to appeal a judgment before another or higher court is a fundamental guarantee of due process whose purpose is to avoid a miscarriage of justice from becoming res judicata. Under the case law of the inter-American system, the purpose of this right is “to prevent a flawed ruling, containing 237 errors unduly prejudicial to a person’s interests, from becoming final.” Due process of law would lack 237 I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 158.