5 The provisions of this article contain one of the fundamental principles of international law, as has been recognized in case law (Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, page 21, and Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, page 29; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, page 184). It has been applied thus by this Court [Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25; Godínez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) of the American Convention of Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989, Series C No. 8, para. 23; Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 10, 1993, Series C No. 15, para. 43]. 15. By virtue of the foregoing, the obligation to make reparation is governed by international law in all of its aspects, such as its scope, characteristics, beneficiaries, etc. which are not subject to modification or suspension by the respondent State through invocation of provisions of its own domestic law (Aloeboetoe et al. Case. Reparations, supra 14, para. 44). 16. Inasmuch as the rule of “restitutio in integrum” cannot be enforced in cases in which the right to life has been violated, reparation to the victims' next of kin and dependents must take alternative forms, such as pecuniary compensation. Such compensation refers primarily to actual damages inflicted which, as this Court has declared on a previous occasion, comprise both material and moral damages (see Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, supra 14, paras. 47 and 49). VI 17. As far as material damages are concerned, in its written communications of November 3, 1995 and May 29, 1996 and at the public hearing on reparations of January 27, 1996, the Commission referred to Cost and Expenses and considered them to include the expenses incurred by the victims' families in their attempts to obtain information about them, and those incurred in their attempts to locate the corpses and in their dealings with the Venezuelan authorities. 18. The total amount requested by the Commission “is US$240,000 to be equally divided among the fourteen families and the two survivors.” In its brief of November 3, 1995, and at the public hearing, the Commission pointed out that the victims' representatives had said that “[t]he State of Venezuela recognized this sum as appropriate and expressly renounced the possibility of demanding proof;” however, it presented no evidence of such a statement. On the contrary, at the public hearing held before this Court, the State described the sum as “astronomical” and “disproportionate.” 19. In its brief of May 29, 1996, the Commission claimed that “[t]he living conditions of the victims and their families preclude the preservation of the pertinent documentary proof; hence the need for estimates to be made.” 20. The State, in its brief of January 2, 1996, after studying the amounts requested by the Commission, declared that “documentary proof of the expenses actually incurred in obtaining information about the victims” had not been produced, that the amount was clearly “disproportionate”, and that it bore no relation to reality.