7 24. It is obvious that the idea here is not to replace the regimen of legality with one of discretionality, as would occur if the formula nulla poena sine lege were to fall into the hand of judicial arbitration. In that event, the punishability is legally foreseen and it corresponds to the judge to, based on the results of the process, rule that it be applied. In the case of precautionary measures –on the top of the list, preventive detention --, it also corresponds to the law, not the judge, to foresee the existence of the measure, but it must only correspond to the latter, based on the body of information available to him and considering the purposes to be reached with the measure –and that, therefore, make its application legal --, to apply it. V. THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT 25. In the Judgment of the Case of López Álvarez we have also considered a procedural subject previously examined and with regard to which there is a ruling of the Court: the guarantees for the issuing of the first statement of the defendant –that may appear in later statements, but possesses special importance on that occasion--, since it may result decisive, beyond suppositions or –once again—technicalities for the result of the process and the defendant’s fate. The construction of the system of guarantees that are relevant to the case in this matter correspond to a revision of the situation and the defendant’s role in the criminal procedure –prior to the process-, in contrast to the situation and the role of the authorities that intervene in it. 26. It is possible that the defendant remain silent, that he abstain from offering a statement, or that he state only a part of what he knows, and prior to offering his statement he must be informed of the motives of the process and that he has the opportunity to appoint legal counsel, as well as to give a statement without being under oath, promise, or obligation to state the truth. All this acquires effectiveness, when at the time of the statement, the defendant’s defense counsel is able to assist him –of course, not to substitute him in the statement or to alter it—and his advisor is present in the act of the statement, so that he may effectively intervene in the protection of the defendant’s rights, as of the first that appear here: to know what it is about and to remain silent. The Court has been explicit in this sense –even when dealing with foreign detainees and the consular assistance comes into the case—and is so again in this case: the due process is violated when the statement occurs without the presence –or may have, I will add—of defense counsel. On the contrary, the accused party’s defense would be seriously threatened precisely when it must be exercised with greater thought, caution, and guarantees. VI. REASONABLE TIME 27. The reasonable time –temporary reference of great importance for the acts of the process and its totality--, that constantly interests the jurisprudence on human rights –European and American--, was once again subject of the consideration of the Court, as has previously happened with frequency, in the case to which this Judgment refers. In the American Convention there are at least three imperious and explicit references in this sense, with their own suppositions and expressions: first, any person detained or retained “shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings” (Article 7(5) that refers to the conditions of the detention and/ or preventive detention, under the generic title “Right to personal liberty”); second, every person “has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time”, by the corresponding