Hence, it can be observed that its assertions in this regard are not sufficiently founded. This is what occurs, for example, when, on analyzing the other 11 judgments of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, it states that “the arguments submitted regarding defects of consent or non-compliance with the obligation to provide information were not verified in order to confirm whether or not these had been constituted” and that “[h]ence, similarly, […this] tribunal […] made an incomplete examination of the claims submitted to its consideration,”44 to conclude that the State violated the said Article 25(1) to the detriment of 12 of the individuals who filed the said appeal for annulment.45 The judgment’s ruling on this aspect is insufficiently founded because, in addition, it departs from what it had indicated as regards, “the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal considered that the consent required by article 31 of Law 17,613 could be express or implied”; that, based on this, it “understood that the petitioners had given consent based on elements such as: (i) signed contracts of “General Conditions for Administration of Investments”; (ii) specific instructions given by clients to the Banco de Montevideo; (iii) the reception by the petitioner of bank statements showing the respective operation, without the petitioner raising objections or making observations, as established in article 35 of Law 6,895; (iv) the interest rates enjoyed by the petitioner, for his share in the certificates of deposit or other product, in the understanding that they enjoyed interest rates that were considerably higher than those offered on fixed-term deposits in the Banco de Montevideo and were also significantly higher than market rates, and (v) the petitioner’s investment profile or regularity in regard to such operations”; that “[t]he first two elements were considered elements of express consent and, regarding the others, it indicated that they could constitute forms of implied consent under banking practice”; that it “indicated repeatedly that, under banking law, both banking norms and banking practice were applicable, so that ��implied consent, and verbal orders by the clients, even by telephone, constitute a reiterated practice under banking law that has give rise to general awareness (‘opinio juris’) of their existence and compulsory nature.”46 In other words, the judgment indicates expressly that the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal analyzed and ruled on the requirement established in article 31 in terms of “without their consent.” Nevertheless, it is true that it did not do so with regard to the defects that, in some cases, could have impaired this consent, because it considered that its function was to rule on the appeal for annulment filed “against the final decision of the Board of the Central Bank,”47 which, in turn, had expressly considered that “the declaration of the annulment of the acceptance of the investment, and any contractual responsibility for the unsuccessful operations carried out that involved error, fraud or negligence, necessarily constitute[d] jurisdictional decisions that exceed[ed] the sphere of the powers granted to the Central Bank of Uruguay under article 31 of Law 17,613.”48 44 Para. 218. 45 Para. 220. 46 Para. 156. 47 Para. 205. 48 Paras. 95 and 134. 13