In other words, since the Bank had ruled that it was not its responsibility to decide on the possible defects that could have impaired the consent that had been granted, what the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal did is consider that this ruling, in the terms of the Constitution – and recorded in the judgment – is not “contrary to a rule of law, [and had not] been issued with misuse, abuse or excess of power”;49 in other words, it also ruled on the issue, but not in the sense that the appellants hoped. In this regard, it is also appropriate to note that the judgment mentions that, in the cases submitted to it, the ordinary justice system examined the issue of defects of consent,50 which would indicate that this remedy also was available to the appellants. Furthermore, based on the two preceding paragraphs, it might have been necessary to consider whether article 31 included the Bank’s competence to rule on its own competence; namely, whether or not the Bank had what is known in the judicial sphere as the “competence of the competence,” or whether that corresponded to administrative or judicial instances. Also, it might have been useful to consider whether the decision on competence is a matter of domestic law or international law. Certainly, it seems more logical to consider that, following a decision by the Bank on its competence in the matter, it was possible to have recourse to the ContentiousAdministrative Tribunal and that this discussion belongs to the sphere of domestic law; whereas it corresponds to the sphere of international law, in this case the Court, to assess the act that, ultimately, could entail the State’s international responsibility under international law, in this case, the Convention. Otherwise, the way the Court proceeded could be mistaken for a “fourth instance.” However, even if it is considered, as in the judgment, that if corresponded to the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal to rule on that matter, it should be recalled that the Court, in order to interpret the right to be heard embodied in Article 8(1) of the Convention resorted, not to a juridical norm created by an autonomous source of international law, but to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, when it stated that “fair proceedings presume that the organ responsible for administering justice conducts ‘a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision.’”51 But, this is precisely what the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal did when it ratified the Bank’s decisions; in other words, it recognized, considered or appreciated the value or merits52 “of the allegations, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties” relating to the decisions of the Bank as “relevant to its decision.” Moreover, and notwithstanding the above, it could be considered that the grounds used by the judgment that, owing to the ruling of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal in the cases mentioned, Article 25(1) of the Convention has been violated, constitute an indirect, insufficient and inadequate way of making this provision applicable to the matter in question. 49 Para. 101. 50 Para. 108. 51 Para. 121. 52 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, op.cit. 14