4 XX. The judgment of the National Terrorism Chamber declared that it was inadmissible to contest the police investigation report, because it considered that the report had been validated by the statements made before the Chamber by a police agent. Moreover, it stated that “the significance of this police investigation report, as regards the nature, methods used and evidence provided in that report, could not be considered accessorily, but as an essential part of the proceeding,” that would be carried out “in due course” (paragraph 88(62)). From the point of view of due process and its requirements, I consider that the declaration of a police agent who had intervened in the elaboration of the police investigation report cannot validate that evidence in international law, because its defect is that the police investigation report contains the attestation of procedures that were carried out without any of the guarantees that would have permitted Ms. Berenson to ensure that everything stated therein was true. XXI. When the defense contested the evidence submitted at the first trial, the National Terrorism Chamber indicated that “even though the police investigation took place at the same time as the military court’s jurisdictional investigation, it complied with the legal norms in force at the time, and although application of those norms was extremely restrictive and abusive, this did not make the evidence inadmissible, but meant that there were probative defects that had to be serenely assessed within the constitutional framework”; in justification, it added that “the police authority acted in the belief that it was duly complying with the law, but under the jurisdictional control that the military court should have exercised (paragraph 88(63)). These considerations caused the Chamber to affirm that it did not waive its powers to assess legality to decide the evidence that could or could not be incorporated into the proceeding. XXII. Following these affirmations, there is nothing in the judgment of the National Chamber to suggest that it excluded that evidence from its considerations when determining Ms. Berenson’s guilt. To the contrary, everything indicates that the Chamber reserved the right to use it, because it only had probative defects and was not “inadmissible evidence.” XXIII. Bearing all of this in mind, I cannot agree with the statement made by the Court that “[t]aking into consideration the characteristics of the military trial, about which this Court has already ruled, and also the arguments of the alleged victim’s defense lawyers concerning the ‘allegedly unlawful origin of the evidence adduced’ and the ‘unconstitutional nature of the legislative framework in force [... it] will only refer to the trial held directly before the civil court.” Separating the evidence in this way, implies that the Inter-American Court had the power and was able to distinguish between the evidence used to determine Ms. Berenson’s guilt and the evidence that was not taken into account and, therefore, that it could determine that the trial in the civil court did not violate Article 8 of the Convention because it had only used admissible evidence. XXIV. I disagree with this for two reasons. First, I consider that the Court did not have the power to distinguish between the evidence and reach the conclusion that, when determining Ms. Berenson’s guilt, the judgment of the National Terrorism Chamber only used the evidence of the trial in the ordinary jurisdiction. In my opinion, this is transforming the Inter-American Court into a court of fourth instance, which is not permitted, either by the norms that regulate the Court or by its own abovementioned case law. Second, it is impossible to make this distinction in this case, given the way in which a criminal judgment is structured in Peru, which does not indicate