REASONED OPINION OF JUDGE CECILIA MEDINA IN THE CASE OF MARTIN-DEL-CAMPO I concur in the Court’s decision that it must not bring into consideration any of the alleged cases of violation of human rights mentioned in the case submitted to it by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and in the brief of observations submitted by the representantives of the victim, but my reasons are, in some aspects, different. The State’s objection refers to several alleged violations of the Convention claimed in the brief of the Inter-American Commission whereby it submits the case to this Court, and in the brief of observations of the victim’s representatives. The first one is claimed to be related to an alleged violation of Article 7 of the American Convention consisting of the State’s maintaining Mr. Martín-del-Campo arbitrarily detained. Arbitrariness in such imprisonment would arise from the fact that the judgment delivered in a penal prosecution against him on May 28, 1993 – and therefore prior to Mexico’s recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction “applicable to the facts or to legal actions ocurring after the date” of recognition – would have been based solely on a confession of the accused which would have been obtained under torture. Even considering that I could agree with the argument that an arbitrary detention is being maintained on a continuous basis, it is impossible, in this case, to examine the alleged artibrariness of such detention without examining the proceedings themselves which resulted in a final judgement delivered prior to the date of recognition and with respect to which this Court does not have jurisdiction. Therefore, I agree with the admission of the non jurisdiction objection ratione temporis in connection with this part of the violations alleged. The second one refers to the declaration of innocence remedy. At first, if violations relative to this remedy were alleged, the Court could have jurisdiction to examine the case, since the remedy was processed after the State’s recognition of this Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Naturally, in order for the Court to be able to admit this case, the submission of the Commission and that of the representatives of the victim would have necessarily had to present the facts based on which a violation of the Convention was alleged. However, the only reason alleged by both, the Commission and the representatives of the victim, to challenge the compatibility of the processing of the declaration of innocence remedy with the State’s international obligations that arise from the Convention, is that said remedy was rejected under circumstances where it should have been admitted since the judgment against which it had been entered, was based solely on a confession obtained under torture. This allegation is not sufficient to establish a claim with respect to a violation of Article 8, since alleging that a remedy has not been admitted is not something that could be related to any of the requirements that this provision establishes to ensure due process. In consequence, the Court cannot pronounce itself on an alleged violation of this article, since no violation pertinent to it has been alleged. The third one refers to the continuity of the offence of torture. Regarding this, I agree with the reasoning of this Court in paragraph 78 of the judgement. Defining a violation as a continuous one for purposes of stretching the Court’s jurisdiction, a jurisdiction that it would not have if we took into consideration the date on which such violation was perpetrated, is something that cannot be applied to torture, since