decision of the Chamber of Appeals demonstrates that it was based on failure to observe regulations. While the State argues at one point that the terms of the 1992 regulations reflect those of the prior regulations that were in effect at the time of the traffic accident, the petitioners maintain that the properly applicable regulations were not cited in the sentence, and were not in any case equivalent to those adopted subsequent to the accident. The petitioners further note that the general norms referred to by the State, dating back to 1945, did not in fact apply to the facts in question. They maintain that the facts of the accident fall under more specific subsequent norms applicable to intersections with traffic lights. 18. With respect to Article 8, the petitioners indicate that, in principle, the appropriate remedy to question the kind of constitutional violations they presented would have been review by the Supreme Court of the Nation. They maintain that, under the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention, Mr. Mohamed had a right to have his conviction reviewed. They contend that the Supreme Court’s rejection of their appeal, absent examination of the merits, violated Mr. Mohamed’s right to be heard with due process. They note that the Supreme Court rejected the extraordinary appeal as “insubstantial and lacking transcendence” (“insustancial o falto de trascendencia”), when what had been placed before it was a violation of rights under both national and international law. The petitioners note that, when they filed a further remedy seeking to revoke that decision of rejection, the Supreme Court rejected the motion as inapplicable. They indicate that the Supreme Court itself had accepted just such an appeal in another case in 1992. They contend that this further demonstrates that Mr. Mohamed did not enjoy the right to be fairly heard before the Argentine courts. B. The State 19. The State maintains that there was no ex post facto imposition of liability in the present case, and that the judicial proceedings respected the requirements of due process. The State maintains that the petition is inadmissible for failing to characterize a violation of a right protected under the American Convention. 20. With respect to the right to freedom from ex post facto laws, the State affirms that Mr. Mohamed was condemned, not on the basis of transit regulations, but on the basis of the codification of negligent homicide set forth in Article 84 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Mohamed was convicted at second instance on the basis of having failed to observe his responsibilities as a driver, rules of objective care that are a matter of international practice. The State notes that the conduct in question, namely having passed another vehicle at a crossroads, is prohibited precisely to preserve the visibility and control of all drivers. This conduct was prohibited in general under the terms of Article 84 of the Criminal Code, in full effect at the time of the facts. 21. The State notes that, while it was unfortunate that the Chamber of Appeals cited transit regulations that were adopted subsequent to the traffic accident in its sentence, those norms referred both to a generally applicable duty of care, and to principles reflected in the transit regulations that had been in force at the time of the accident. The State refers generally in this regard to the transit regulations adopted in 1945 and revalidated in 1985, setting forth duties on the part of drivers. The State refers to Article 65 of the 1945 regulations, which concern the duty of drivers to maintain control over their vehicles, and to Article 47, which describes pulling forward in an intersection as a grave offense where this would disrupt traffic or place third parties at risk. The State underlines that the error of the Chamber of Appeals in no way