generates different opinions and that must be tended to by the Inter-American Court, as has occurred. I am referring to the petition to reconsider decisions included in the judgment whose interpretation is requested. The State expressed that it wants the modification of some aspects of the judgment and that with said purpose it presents the petition we are currently analyzing. In effect, it stated that “the cornerstone of our argument (…) seeks a change in the form of compliance of some of the operative paragraphs.” Now, the forms of compliance do not constitute agreements foreign to the judgment, but instead they are part of it. With regard to this matter, it is convenient to go back to the powers of the Inter-American Court, to the nature of the judgment issued by the latter, to the nature and scope of an argument of interpretation, and to the standard jurisprudence of the tribunal regarding each and every one of these matters. 25. The Inter-American Court does not have the power to modify its judgments, in response to objections presented by the parties. The Convention does not grant it this power, nor has it created the possibility that it reform its judgments through a proceeding that could be compared to a reconsideration, appeal, or annulment. If it did so, it would exceed its powers. 26. What the Court can do with regard to the judgments issued and notified is interpret them upon request of the parties to the proceedings. This is a matter different to the objection of a judgment and its possible modification. However, interpreting does not imply alteration of the terms of the judgment. It does not imply the issuing of a new judgment, but simply the clarification or precision of the sense and scope of the decisions adopted, which remain final. The exercise of the power of interpretation assumes darkness or lack of precision in the text of a ruling, but not a step back in the examination of a matter that has already been analyzed and decided on, or withdrawal of the definitiveness that corresponds to a judgment on merits. 27. In the present case it is not necessary that the Court develop greater explanations about the sense of the words used or the meaning of the decisions adopted, which are not obscure or imprecise, but instead clear and explicit. That is probably why the request for interpretation has mentioned the desire that the Court “change” –not only interpret—certain aspects of the judgment. In the end, the Court limited itself –as expressed—“to the nature and scope of the request for interpretation pursuant to the Inter-American system, which does not suppose a new presentation of facts or juridical considerations regarding the same, additional to those presented by the parties in the dispute on merits and analyzed by the Tribunal for the purposes of the corresponding Judgment.” 28. The Court has been asked to consider certain implications of some of the aspects of the judgment in what refers to the public acknowledgment of responsibility, the diffusion of the judgment, payment of compensations to several people, and the engraving of names on the monument known as “The eye that cries”. 29. During the international trial the State admitted facts it was charged with and accepted the international responsibility attributed to it. Now the matter is that said acknowledgment must transcend to the domestic realm, as is characteristic of the international human rights protection system. The Court has not specified who must make the acknowledgment, nor has it gone into details in what specific media, programs, and hours the parts of the judgment must be broadcasted. The general and special statements regarding these matters must be associated with the obtainment of the objective sought with these measures, linked to the current and future protection of human rights. There is, therefore, a connection of those with the purpose they seek to serve and with the reasonable manner in which it