95. In its case law related to sanctions on judges for exercising the right to freedom of expression, the European Court has taken the following elements into account: the office held by the applicant; the content of the statements being challenged; the context in which the statements were made; and the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed.79 96. The case law of the Commission and the Inter-American Court has indicated that limitations on freedom of expression must be the exception, and to be admissible, they must meet three basic conditions established in Article 13(2) of the Convention: (a) the limitation must have been precisely and clearly defined through formal and material law. The IACHR has maintained that vague or ambiguous legal provisions that grant very broad discretionary powers to the authorities are incompatible with the American Convention, because they can support potential arbitrary acts that are tantamount to prior censorship or that establish disproportionate liabilities for the expression of speech protected by the treaty. 80 Also, for subsequent liability that restricts freedom of expression to be legitimate, it is not enough for it to simply be spelled out clearly and precisely in a law. It must also be determined (b) whether the objective the limitation pursues is legitimate and justified by the American Convention and (c) whether the limitation is necessary in a democratic society, adequate to meet the objective it pursues, and strictly proportional to the end being sought.81 97. The IACHR maintains that in every case in which a violation of the duty to exercise prudence is alleged because of a judge’s or prosecutor’s participation in a matter of public interest, a careful assessment must be done to determine whether the expression of opinion affected the judge’s independence and impartiality to such an extent as to warrant a disciplinary sanction. It is up to the State to prove that the purpose of the limitations imposed is strictly to protect these principles, and that the limitations have been interpreted narrowly, as they constitute an exception to the general principle whereby freedom of expression is a broad right guaranteed to every person equally and is especially protected in the case of speech on matters of public interest.82 98. In the case at hand, the Commission observes that the ruling that dismissed Mr. Nissen Pessolani from his position argued that he had “provided information and made comments and statements to the press and third parties that went beyond the sensitive parameters of criminal investigation in its preliminary stage, thus affecting the honor, the reputation, or the presumption of innocence guaranteed to all citizens,” and that this conduct constituted the grounds laid out in Article 14 subparagraph (n) of Law No. 1084. In addition, the judgment stated that “with the newspaper editions, magnetic tapes (cassettes), and audiovisual tapes (videocassettes) sent to this jury by different written and oral media outlets, it is possible to verify that the accused is dangerously prone to revealing to the public the preliminary steps he is taking in the cases he is responsible for investigating.” Finally, the judgment found it “alarming” that the alleged victim had “an undue tendency” to disclose and inform the public through the media about procedural steps, investigations, testimony, and documents. 99. The Commission notes that the punitive judgment against the alleged victim did not determine, specifically and clearly, the statements he made; the dates, context, and media outlets to which he made them; and how these statements allegedly violated the rights of the individuals involved in the investigations being carried out by Mr. Nissen Pessolani. This lack of specificity of facts and evidence is incompatible with the duty to provide grounds for decisions, as it prevents an understanding of how the JEM made its assessment and does not explain the reasons that determined the alleged victim’s dismissal from office. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Baka v. Hungary, Application no 20261/12, judgment of June 23, 2016, para. 159; see also European Court of Human Rights, Case of Wille v. Liechtenstein, judgment of October 28, 1999, para. 63. 80 IACHR, Annual Report 2009, Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 51, December 30, 2009, Chapter III, para. 71. 81 IACHR, Report No. 103/13, Case 12.816, Report on the Merits, Adán Guillermo Lopez Lone et al., Honduras, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149, Doc. 27, November 5, 2013, para. 203. 82 Mutatis mutandi, IACHR, Report No. 103/13, Case 12.816, Report on the Merits, Adán Guillermo López Lone et al., Honduras, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149, Doc. 27, November 5, 2013, para. 214. 79 19