107. The right of appeal is a part of due process of law, under Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention.85 With respect to this guarantee, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide, referring to judges, that “decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review.” 86 The Commission has found that this matter extends to justice operators such as prosecutors, who should have certain guarantees of tenure and whose review of a conviction demands the possibility of a comprehensive examination of the decision being appealed,87 which requires that it be verified by a higher body that can analyze the issues of fact, evidence, and law on which the contested judgment was based.88 This remedy must be guaranteed before the judgment becomes res judicata; it must be resolved within a reasonable period of time, in other words, it must be timely; and it must be effective, in other words, it must provide results or responses to the end that it was intended to serve. Moreover, the remedy must be accessible; hence, the kind of complex formalities that would render this right illusory must not be required.89 108. The IACHR has maintained that the State has a general obligation to provide effective judicial recourse to persons who claim to be victims of human rights violations (Article 25), and that remedy must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Article 8.1). For an effective recourse to exist, it is not enough for it to be established by law; rather, it needs to be truly appropriate for establishing whether there has been a human rights violation and for providing whatever is necessary to remedy this.90 109. The IACHR calls to mind that the legal framework applicable to this case establishes, in its Article 21, with regard to final judgments issued by the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates, that “any final judgments, resolutions, and orders that the Jury may decree cannot be appealed to any other body.” However, a petition for reversal or clarification may be filed before the same Jury. Only an action of unconstitutionality may be examined by another body; such an action is resolved by the Supreme Court en banc. The Commission observes that by its nature and legal configuration, a petition for reversal and clarification does not allow for a thorough review of the JEM’s decisions, nor it is an appropriate remedy that ensures the right for the decision to be reviewed by a higher court. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that the alleged victim lodged a petition for reversal and clarification, which was denied on April 22, 2003, as the JEM considered that the appellant had requested clarification of matters that were clearly laid out in Article 31 of Law No. 1084. 110. In addition, the Commission notes that the petitioner filed an action of unconstitutionality with the Supreme Court on April 22, 2003. This action was rejected on June 16, 2004, essentially because “no infringements of rights or constitutional guarantees were observed in the judgment being challenged, nor was there arbitrariness in the decision criteria.” With regard to this appeal, the IACHR notes that although the record does not show that the magistrates who participated in the JEM signed the decision, it is problematic for this appeal to have been resolved by the full Supreme Court, which includes two members of the JEM. The Commission further observes, based on the limited legal framework and the content of the June 14, 2004, decision issued by the Supreme Court, that the action of unconstitutionality is a remedy that in principle does not allow for a thorough review or examination of the facts or the evidence with regard to the decision to dismiss the alleged victim; rather, the scope of its competence is limited to matters of due process, without the remedy being effective to enable protection of the alleged victim’s rights. As laid out above, in ruling on this appeal, the Supreme Court found that the principle of consistency was not affected, because the JEM acted in accordance with Article 21 subparagraph (h), which gives it the authority to order, at any stage in the proceedings, any procedural steps that may be necessary to shed light on the facts. However, as has been explained, without being given the appropriate opportunity and faced with a new factual basis for the charges, Mr. Nissen was not able to exercise his right of defense. I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of July 2, 2004, Series C No. 107, para. 158. 86 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principle 20. 87 I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of July 2, 2004, Series C No. 107, para. 165. 88 I/A Court H.R., Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations, Judgment of May 14, 2013, Series C. No. 260, para. 245. 89 IACHR, Report No. 33/14, Case 12.820, Manfred Amrhein et al., Costa Rica, April 4, 2014, para.186 and ff. 90I/A Court H.R., Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of November 24, 2006, Series C No. 158, para. 125; Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of June 17, 2005, Series C No. 125, para. 61; Case of the "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 136. 85 21