61. Regarding the first of these points, the information available indicates that when the petition was presented, Mr. Zegarra Marín was no longer in prison, since an order was adopted during the proceedings declaring his preventive custody inadmissible. Thus, that aspect of the petition was resolved by the State through domestic channels. In such circumstances, the petitioner’s claims would be limited to seeking redress for that circumstance, but no information appears regarding remedies pursued toward that end. Consequently, it declares that element of the petition inadmissible. 62. As regards the second point, the Commission notes that the alleged victim challenged the PNP resolution whereby he was forcibly retired through both administrative and judicial channels. The annexes to the case file indicate that both appeals were ruled inadmissible because the petitioner had lodged the reconsideration remedy after the filing deadline had passed, which prevented him from securing a judgment on the merits of the matter in accordance with applicable law. The petitioner claims that the delay in filing was because he was unaware of the resolution; however, the proceedings saw several items of evidence that led to the conclusion that Mr. Zegarra Marín had been apprised of the resolution. The Commission has no evidence to justify disputing that conclusion, nor did the petitioner submit further arguments in that regard. The Commission therefore considers that as regards this point, the petitioner exhausted the available domestic remedies incorrectly. 63. With regard to the third point, the Commission notes that the petitioner pursued the ordinary and special remedies available to him. Thus, the documents presented by the petitioner indicate that he lodged an appeal for annulment against his conviction. That appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Criminal Chamber on December 17, 1997, on the grounds that the guilt of the alleged victim had been established. The case file also indicated that on September 14, 1998, the petitioner lodged a special review appeal, alleging violations of due process and of the principle of presumption of innocence. That remedy was resolved unfavorably for him by the Supreme Court of Justice on August 24, 1999, which ruled it not to be covered by the grounds expressly provided for in law for its admissibility. The State has submitted no information about any other possible remedies available to the petitioner for challenging the alleged violations. 64. In consideration whereof, the Commission believes that as regards the alleged violations of due process, the petitioner did exhaust the domestic remedies in compliance with the requirement imposed by Article 46.1.a of the American Convention. In the following paragraphs, the IACHR will restrict its analysis of the other admissibility requirements to that aspect of the petition. C. Filing Period 65. Article 46.1.b of the Convention states that for a petition to be admissible, it must be lodged within a period of six months following the date on which the complainant was notified of the final judgment at the national level. 66. As indicated in paragraph 64 above, the domestic remedies were exhausted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of August 24, 1999, of which notice was served on November 5 of that year.7 The petition is dated February 8, 2000, and it was received by the IACHR on May 16, 2000. Although it is uncertain on what date it was sent, the Commission believes that it is reasonable to assume some delay between its deposit in the postal system and its delivery, and it therefore concludes that eleven days is a reasonable delay for the lodging of the petition. The Commission, citing the Inter-American Court, has on different occasions stated the generally accepted principle that the procedural system is a means of 7 Annex 8 of the initial petition, received on May 16, 2000. The Peruvian State does not dispute the date of notification. 8