17 a. The State pointed out that in Report 17/97 the Commission’s request was limited to the annulment of the proceedings of the exclusive military jurisdiction against the alleged victims, so that they would be tried again before the civilian court. On this basis, the State argued that neither the Commission nor the petitioners exhausted the domestic jurisdiction of Peru, and that the requests included in the application should concern the matters established in the conclusions and recommendations of the Report. During the public hearing, Peru added that the State had found its “right to argue curtailed and had to assert its right by means of an objection which also pertains to the merits of the case.” b. The Commission stated that neither the Convention nor the Rules of Procedure refer to “the alleged necessity to duplicate the same list of conclusions and recommendations from the Article 50 report in the application to the Court.” Moreover, the Commission indicated that by note of July 8, 1997, Peru submitted its observations on Report 17/97, and in them did not mention any measures adopted to comply with the recommendations set forth in the report. In conformance with the principle non bis in idem, Peru could not try the alleged victims in the civilian jurisdiction on the same facts as had been considered by the military jurisdiction, for which reason the Commission requested the annulment of the proceedings. 72. The Court refers back to the observations it made with respect to the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, which it examined as to the first objection (supra 53 and 56) and to which it also alluded when considering the State’s second objection (supra 60). 73. It is also important to comment on the State’s argument that there is a certain incongruity in the position sustained by the Commission, when the combination of its arguments is considered. The State asserted that on the one hand the Commission requested the annulment of the proceedings that culminated in a final conviction of the alleged victims, and on the other, required their immediate release. Even though the statements in these requests could have been more precisely formulated so as to avoid confusion, the Court deems that the incongruity is more apparent than real. The annulment of a trial that resulted in a final judgment of conviction does not imply the commencement of a new trial against the same person for the same facts, which would be a flagrant violation of the principle of non bis in idem, but would lead instead to the immediate and absolute release of the accused. The Court, on examining the statements of the Commission, can establish their possible scope, which has a double objective; the annulment of the trial on the one hand, and the release of the accused as a natural legal effect of that annulment, on the other. 74. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court considers that this preliminary objection is inadmissible. VIII LEGAL CAPACITY AND STANDING 75. The fifth objection interposed by the State refers to the