10 expression”and “cast light on the real reason for the imprisonment of Mr. Cesti Hurtado.” 37. As to the allegations of the State concerning the alleged incompetence of “an organization composed of non Peruvians” to question the legal order of that State (supra 35(d)), the Court will limit itself to state for the record that these statements are not compatible with the obligations undertaken by the State under the Convention. 38. The Court will not examine the arguments concerning the political affiliation of the representation of Mr. Cesti Hurtado. The presentation to this Court of arguments such as those described is irrelevant. 39. The other aspects of the second preliminary objection interposed by the State are closely related to the preliminary objection of res judicata. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to consider them when it addresses the third preliminary objection (infra 46). 40. The third objection filed by the State concerns the authority of res judicata which, in the State’s opinion, is held by the judgment that condemns Mr. Cesti Hurtado to imprisonment. 41. As grounds for this objection, the State submitted a summary of its interpretation of the facts of the present case and also its arguments, which are summarized by the Court as follows: a) that the writ of habeas corpus was brought against a provisional detention order issued in a criminal proceeding, and that that order was only in existence until the time that the conviction was handed down; and b) that the sanction of imprisonment to which Mr. Cesti Hurtado has been subjected derives from a final judgment issued in a final instance by a military court, which it has the authority of res judicata and, therefore, is “set [and] irreversible.” Therefore, the State requests that “that judgment be respected.” 42. On its behalf, the Commission argued: a) that although it is true that the writ of habeas corpus was interposed to question the legality of a detention order that had a provisional character, preventive detention is a precautionary measure that should be ordered by a competent judge; that the judgment issued in the habeas corpus proceeding “[was] based on the fact that the military tribunal was not competent [to restrict the freedom of Mr. Cesti] and, consequently, it could not validly order preventive detention, nor, much less, a final judgment”; b) that, therefore, the conviction rendered by the military tribunal would be the legal result of the lack of jurisdiction, as held by the judge that decided the motion for habeas corpus; and c) that the filing of a writ of habeas corpus cannot be required for each procedural act taken in the course of a trial, “on pain of those who have not been the object of [such writ] remaining purged or imprisoned ”; and that