14 of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 133, and Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 130). 39. In the instant case, the Court accepts the evidentiary value of the documents submitted by the victim’s next of kin and by the State that were neither contested nor objected to, and whose authenticity was not challenged; hence, the Court regards them as valid (Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C. No. 35, para. 29, and cf. Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, supra 38, para. 53). 40. The State objected to the offer of testimony by Cronwell Pierre CastilloCastillo, Carmen Rosa Páez-Warton and Mónica Inés Castillo-Páez, made in the reparations brief, arguing that “it is improper and irregular for the interested party to intervene as a witness.” It also objected to the declaration signed in the presence of a notary and to the expert report prepared by Dr. Carmen Wurst-Calle de Landazuri (supra 35). The Court notes that while the victim’s next of kin did not testify (supra 34), the affidavits they signed in the presence of a notary had been suggested by the President of the Court for the sake of procedural economy and speed. This was to ensure that the oral proceedings in the instant case would be as expeditious as possible, without infringing the right of the victim’s next of kin, of the Commission and of the State to offer whatever testimony they believed should be heard directly by the Court. The Court confirms the President’s decision, which helped advance the proceedings, and so orders that the affidavits be added to the body of evidence in the instant case. The Court has discretionary authority to weigh the declarations or statements submitted to it, both in writing and by other means. As with any tribunal, the Court may use the rule of “sound criticism” to weigh the evidence properly, thus enabling the judges to arrive at a decision as to the truth of the alleged acts while taking into account the object and purpose of the American Convention (cf. Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 76, and Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, supra 38, para. 57). 41. Peru has stated that it left in a defenseless position because the affidavits signed in the presence of a notary were not brought to its attention in advance of the public hearing. The Court observes that the document in which those statements appear was received by the Court on June 4, 1998, only a few days before the hearing in question and that it was therefore unable to forward them to the State as far in advance as it might have preferred. The Court further notes that in observance of the principle of the procedural equality of the parties and to guarantee the transparency of the proceedings, the Secretariat notifies each party of every communication the other party sends, so that the former has an opportunity to refute or comment on what the latter has stated. There are no specific rules establishing a deadline or timeframe within which the Court must act. However, the understanding is that it must do so in such a way as to enable the other party to properly exercise its right of self-defense within the context of the proceedings. In the instant case, the State had an opportunity to exercise that right and did so, since it explained its position on the matter in briefs dated July 20 and September 9, 1998. The Court forwarded those briefs to the victim’s next of kin and to the Commission, following the guidelines described herein, and in this Judgment will weigh the arguments of all parties concerning the statements made in the presence of the notary and the briefs filed by the State according to the principles set forth herein (supra 40). 42. The State objected to the "sworn affidavits" and other documents, such as the powers of attorney granted by the victim’s next of kin, by alluding to a number