26 80. The Commission requested that compensation for moral damages be set at a total of US$125,000.00 (one hundred twenty-five thousand United States dollars) “to be divided equitably among the three members of the victim’s family”; in support of this argument, it cited the precedents established by the Court in the Velásquez Rodríquez, Godínez Cruz and Aloeboetoe et al. cases. 81. The victim’s next of kin supplied three statements signed in the presence of a notary (supra 15), wherein they narrated the various suffering that the disappearance of Ernesto Rafael Castillo-Páez had caused them. Those statements underscored the pain over the loss of the victim, Ms. Mónica Inés Castillo-Páez’ move to Sweden and then to the Netherlands, the break-up of the family nucleus and its eventual reunion in the Netherlands after almost eight years of separation. In support of these damages, they submitted the Expert Report that explained the general psychological consequences that forced disappearance and asylum have. 82. The State stated that it was not in agreement with any of the sums requested by the Commission and by the victim’s next of kin and called the Court’s attention to the “disproportionate claims submitted by the next of kin, who are seeking US$500,000.00 (five hundred thousand United States dollars) in moral damages, US$5,000.00 (five thousand United States dollars) for the medical and psychological rehabilitation of family members, and US$100,000.00 (one hundred thousand United States dollars) for violation of Ernesto Rafael Castillo-Páez’ right to life. * * * 83. The Court is of the opinion that while case law may establish precedents in this regard, it cannot be invoked as an absolute criterion, as each case must be examined individually (Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, supra 50, para. 55). 84. As for moral damages, the Court has previously held that there are numerous cases in which other international tribunals have decided that a judgment of condemnation constitutes per se adequate reparation for moral damages, as demonstrated by the case law of, among others, the European Court of Human Rights (Cour eur. D. H. arrêt Kruslin 24 du avril 1990, série A no. 176-A, p. 25, párr. 39; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt McCallun du 30 août 1990, série A no. 183, p. 17, párr. 37; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Wassink du 27 septembre 1990, série A no. 185-A, p. 15, párr. 41; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Koendjbiharie du 25 octobre 1990, série A no. 185-B, p. 42, párr. 34; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Darby du 23 octobre 1990, série A no. 187, p. 14, párr. 40; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Lala c. Pays-Bas du 22 Septembre 1994, série A No. 297-A, p. 15, párr. 38; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Pelladoah c. Pays-Bas du 22 septembre 1994, série A no. 297-B, p. 26, párr. 44; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Kroon et autres c. Pays-Bas du 27 octobre 1994, série A no. 297-C, p. 59, párr. 45; Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Boner c. Royaume-Uni du 28 octobre 1994, série A no. 300-B, p. 76, párr. 46; Cour eur. D. H. arrêt Ruiz Torija c. Espagne du 9 décembre 1994, série A no. 303-A, p. 13, párr. 33). However, it is the view of this Court that a condemnatory judgment does not suffice when the right to life is concerned, and the reparation for the moral suffering caused to the victim and to the family must take an alternative form, such as pecuniary compensation. Such cases require this category of reparation. The pecuniary compensation should be determined on the basis of equity and by a prudent assessment of the moral damages, which cannot be measured by any absolute rule (cf. El Amparo Case, Reparations, supra 50, para. 35). This same principle was established by the European Court, which pointed out that moral damages do not lend themselves to precise evaluation (Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Wiesinger du 30 octobre 1991, série A no. 213, p. 29, para. 85; Cour eur. D. H., arrêt Kenmache c. France (article 50) du 2 novembre 1993, série A no. 270-B, p. 16, para. 11;