2 situation that is appropriate and that I have been advocating for the Inter-American Court in recent years. 1 5. As regards the Court in The Hague, however, the optional clause on compulsory jurisdiction, which continues to exist, has been stratified over time and, nowadays, no longer responds to the necessities of international contentious cases, even purely inter-State cases. This is due to a permissive stance taken by the ICJ, reflecting a voluntarist conception of international law, which has allowed and accepted all types of limitations imposed by the States when recognizing the international Court’s jurisdiction, on their own terms. 6. It would be unfortunate if Article 62 of the American Convention was, ultimately, as ill-fated as Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. Indeed, the invalid and incongruent State practice under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute cannot serve as an example or model to follow for the States Parties to treaties for the protection of human rights, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, as regards the scope of the jurisdictional basis for the actions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Here we are confronted with superior values shared by our community of nations that cannot be left to the mercy of the vicissitudes of the individual “will” of each State Party to the American Convention. II. Compulsory international jurisdiction: Lata. new reflections Lex 7. By protecting fundamental values shared by the international community as a whole, contemporary international law has overcome the anachronic voluntarist conception belonging to a distant past. Contrary to what some rare, nostalgic survivors of the apogee of positivism-voluntarism presume, the methodology of interpreting human rights treaties developed on the basis of rules of interpretation embodied in international law (such as those stipulated in Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties) applies to both the substantive provisions (on the protected rights) and the clauses that regulate international protection mechanisms – based on the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which corresponds to the so-called effet utile (sometimes called the principle of effectiveness), amply supported by international case law. 8. The case law of the Inter-American Court contains clear examples in this regard. Thus, in its judgment on competence in the Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein cases (1999), with regard to Peru, the Inter-American Court maintained that: “Acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction is an ironclad clause to which there can be no limitations except those expressly provided for in Article 62(1) of the American Convention. Because the clause is so fundamental to the operation of the Convention’s system of protection, it cannot be at the mercy of limitations not already stipulated but invoked by States Parties for internal reasons." 2 1 . Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Las Cláusulas Pétreas de la Protección Internacional del Ser Humano: El Acceso Directo de los Individuos a la Justicia a Nivel Internacional y la Intangibilidad de la Jurisdicción Obligatoria de los Tribunales Internacionales de Derechos Humanos", in El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos en el Umbral del Siglo XXI - Memoria del Seminario (Nov. 1999), vol. I, 2a. ed., San José, Costa Rica, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2003, pp. 3-68. 2 . IACtHR, Case of the Constitutional Court (Competence), Judgment of September 24, 1999, Series C, No. 55, para. 35; IACtHR, Case of Ivcher Bronstein (Competence), Judgment of September 24, 1999, Series C, No. 54, para. 36.