According to the provision in the Convention that this Article refers to, the Court is authorized to interpret its judgments should there be a disagreement as to their meaning or scope. 15. As mentioned above (supra 5), the State alleges that its request for interpretation is founded on discrepancies between the judgment on merits delivered by the Court on January 24, 1998, and the judgment on reparations delivered on January 22, 1999, since “[f]rom the literal transcription of the relevant parts of both judgments, it is determined that the judgment on reparations contains an assessment of economic compensation that is totally distinct from the one indicated in the judgment on merits”. 16. Regarding the request filed by the State, the Inter-American Commission indicated that it is “indisputable that the ‘expenses of an extrajudicial nature’ that the […] Court ordered to be paid are included among the expenses incurred by the next of kin of [the] victim ‘in their representations to the Guatemalan authorities’. As the Court has already mentioned in the judgment on reparations “such expenses are of an extrajudicial nature since, as has been proved, the next of kin of Nicholas Blake did not have recourse to the domestic tribunals”1. The Commission added that the Court was clear when it stated the reasons that justified the payment of the expenses in this case, and cited paragraphs 42 to 50, 69 and 70, among others, of the judgment on reparations. Moreover, it indicated that this reimbursement was included in the concept of “fair compensation”. 17. The next of kin of Nicholas Blake stated that there was no impreciseness in the judgment on reparations, which, in their opinion, specifically incorporated the terms of the Convention. They therefore requested the Court to declare the request inadmissible. 18. The Court has stated that [the] interpretation of a judgment implies not only the precision of the text of the rulings of the judgment, but also the determination of the scope, meaning and intention of the ruling, according to the relevant considerations. This has been the criterion of international jurisprudence (Eur. Court H. R., Ringeisen case (Interpretation of the Judgment of 22 June 1972), judgment of 23 June 1973, Series A, Vol. 16)2. 19. Likewise, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has established that the subject matter of the interpretation of a judgment cannot modify obligatory aspects of the judgment3. 20. With regard to the request for interpretation, the Court considers that its findings in a previous case are applicable, in the sense 1. Blake case, Reparations (Article 63.1 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of January 22, 1999. Series C No. 48, para. 49. 2. Velásquez Rodríguez case, Interpretation of the Judgment on Compensatory Damages (Article 67 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of August 17, 1990. Series C No. 9, para. 26 and Godínes Cruz case, Interpretation of the Judgment on Compensatory Damages (Article 67 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of August 17, 1990. Series C No. 10, para.. 26. 3. Eur. Court H. R., Allenet de Ribemont v. France Case (Interpretation of the Judgment of 7 August 1996) and Eur. Court H. R., Hentrich v. France Case (Interpretation of the Judgment of 3 July 1997), Reports on Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV.