that the transparency of this Tribunal’s proceedings is enhanced by clarification, when it so deems appropriate, of the content and scope of its Judgments, thereby dissipating any doubts about them and that they may not be challenged by merely formal considerations4. 21. In its brief, the State affirms that, according to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the general rule is that “the terms should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning”. The Court observes that the article mentioned by Guatemala does not establish a sole criterion for interpretation because, fundamentally, treaties should be interpreted “in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. 22. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that, even when the scope and meaning of the provisions of the judgment on reparations are clear, it is useful to explain the points raised by the State in order to eliminate any doubts regarding the payment of expenses of an extrajudicial nature and the reimbursement of the expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights. V THE PAYMENT OF EXPENSES OF AN EXTRAJUDICIAL NATURE AND THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES INCURRED BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 23. The Court proceeds to examine clauses a.iii. and b) of the second ruling of the judgment on reparations which ordered payment of reparations for extrajudicial expenses and reimbursement of expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American system (supra 7). 24. In its request for interpretation, the State referred to the fourth ruling of the judgment on merits and to the second ruling, clauses a.iii. and b), of the judgment on reparations. On these points, the State alleged that there are “absolute” discrepancies between them, because the judgment on merits ordered Guatemala to reimburse “the expenses incurred in their representations to the Guatemalan authorities in connection with this process” while the judgment on reparations ordered the State to pay for extrajudicial expenses and to reimburse the expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American system. In the ordinary sense, the phrase “expenses in representations to the Guatemalan authorities” does not include “expenses of an extrajudicial nature” or “expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights”. The State concludes that neither the Commission nor the Court may be considered “Guatemalan authorities”. 25. With regard to the first issue raised by the State, in relation to the payment of US$16,000.00 (sixteen thousand United States dollars) to the next of kin of Nicholas Blake for “expenses of an extrajudicial nature”, the Court clarifies that when it ordered this payment, it referred to expenses incurred by the victim’s next of kin in their personal representations to the Guatemalan authorities, in particular, military and administrative Executive authorities, in the process to investigate the 4. El Amparo case, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment on Reparations of September 14, 1996, Order of the Court of April 16, 1997, p. 123, first ‘considering’ clause.