5 of the Court of March 8, 1998, Annual Report 1998, p. 209, para. 16; in keeping with the Neira Alegría et al. Case, Order of the Court of July 3, 1992, Annual Report 1992, p.79, para. 23) The case law of this Court is consistent with that of the European Court of Human Rights, which held that interpretation of a judgment shall not alter it in respect of any issue that the Court decided “with binding force” (Eur. Court HR, Allenet de Ribemont v. France, Judgment of 7 August 1996 (interpretation) and Eur. Court HR, Hentrich v. France, Judgment of 3 July 1997 (interpretation), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV). In the instant case, the Court notes that the State’s comments on the subject of the payment of costs and expenses make no mention of issues whose meaning or scope might be ambiguous or obscure. Quite the contrary, what the State indicates in its petition is its disagreement with that part of the judgment that stipulates that said payment shall be tax exempt. 21. However, although the meaning and scope of the judgment on reparations are clear from its language, given the position taken in respect of the first point raised in the request for interpretation (supra 17, in fine) the Court believes it would be useful to explore the point raised by Ecuador concerning the reasons why tax exemption was ordered for costs and expenses. It will, therefore, explain this part of the judgment on reparations. V ON THE USE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 22. As stated previously (supra 15), the Court will examine whether the tax exemption ordered in subparagraph b of operative paragraph four of the judgment on reparations applies to the “use and administration” of the amounts owed to the victim, his spouse and his daughter in the form of compensatory damages. 23. The State commented that “the amount that this Court set […] is not subject to taxes of any kind at the time it is received, nor is it subject to withholding tax.” However, it argued that the use and administration of said amount, interest earned on it and the use of that interest are new revenue-generating circumstances and are and must be taxed, because they are not the amount ordered and paid but rather proceeds from the use to which the amount paid is put.” 24. For its part, the Commission stated the following: The Court is not saying that the use to which the sum received as compensatory damages is put –either now or in the future- should be tax exempt if such use is taxable under local tax law. The Court has not granted some undefined, lifetime tax exemption; it has confined itself to the otherwise taxable compensatory damages and costs, as these are the issues it is called upon to decide. 25. For his part, Mr. Suárez Rosero described certain aspects of Ecuador’s tax system and the mechanisms that, in his view, would be used to tax the compensatory damages. In his comments he stated that Ecuadorian law prescribes a 1% tax surcharge on any monetary transaction effected through institutions in the financial system. These transactions include check cashing at financial institutions, bank deposits and any other investment or savings medium. For this reason, Mr. Suárez Rosero’s interpretation is that if payment is made in the form of some