3 9. All reparations measures are based on general and objective rules (that exist independently and apart from any decision reached by the parties to a specific case, who are the subjects of the litigation and of the proceeding) that are national and international in nature and applicable to the field of human rights. In other words, all reparations measures are based on domestic laws or on the provisions of conventions that establish the duty to respect the rights of persons and the obligation to make reparation when that duty is violated. That having been said, the following can and must be distinguished: a) the premise that the parties can arrive at a settlement as to the content and performance of specific reparations, through an agreement that postdates the general and objective norm and whose efficacy is recognized by that general and objective norm; and b) circumstances that necessarily preclude any settlement between the parties, because the reparations are dictated by law and are not negotiable. 10. The agreement between parties, which the Court can approve, is only admissible and effective when it is legitimate –in the sense indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 above- and addresses the second category of issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which tend to be property-related and require specific pecuniary obligations. Therefore, in principle the terms of the agreement that concern compensation for material and moral damages and procedural costs and expenses merit consideration –and may even be binding-. The judgment delivered in the Barrios Altos Case, Reparations, finds that the agreement between the parties on the matter of compensation is admissible and can be approved, thereby making it final, with all the effects that follow therefrom. 11. On the other hand, other reparation measures are beyond the purview of the parties. They are inherent in certain inalienable and immutable functions that the State must discharge in exercise of its authorities or in performance of its duties or obligations. Either party may unilaterally propose –provided the other party so agrees- practicable and convenient ways or modalities for complying with those obligations. But no proposal can alter, replace, diminish or supplant the natural and immutable duties that the legal system assigns to government. 12. And so, it is not the will of the parties, but rather the law that determines that the State has: a) a “criminal justice duty” (to investigative the violations, prosecute those responsible, issue the verdict of condemnation and carry out the sentences that the law requires); or b) an obligation to adopt the legislative or conventionrelated measures (for example, the conclusion or ratification of an international treaty) required under the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 2); or c) a decision to refrain from incurring human rights violations (conduct that is inherent in a State governed by the rule of law and that is provided for at the highest level of the domestic and international legal order). Furthermore, some of these measures are provided for in the judgment delivered on the merits of the present case on March 14, 2001. 13. Settlements do not create, modify, much less extinguish rights and duties, regardless of what the parties to a settlement may agree upon with respect to these issues. The terms of any agreement between the parties merely underscore the existence of those rights and duties, or an “awareness of their existence.” Whatever the case, the points they agree upon expedite settlement of the differences. This is the function of such agreements, and not an inconsequential one. But their function is not to be an authoritative document, composed by the parties, that defines or