the right to proceedings being initiated, where the parties who disagree may, inter alia, submit their respective arguments, present evidence, and contest each other.” In this regard, the provisions of Article 8(1) constitute in themselves a remedy against acts of the State that have affected rights, so that, in consequence, the corresponding sanctionary powers may be exercised. The above-mentioned dissenting opinion recalls that this “has been clearly established by the Court in the precedents cited in the judgment” in reference. A second possible interpretation, which does not exclude the preceding one, is considered in the same dissenting opinion, which recalls that the Court has repeatedly indicated, with regard to Article 8(1) that “its application is not strictly limited to judicial remedies,” that “although the jurisdictional function belongs, in particular, to the Judiciary, other public body or authorities may exercise functions of the same type,” and that, therefore, “any State body that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature has the obligation to adopt decisions that are in consonance with the guarantees of due process of law in the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention.” The judgment reiterates these affirmations and thus indicates that “Article 8 of the American Convention establishes the standards for due process of law, which consist of a series of requirements that must be observed by the procedural instances, so that every person may defend his rights adequately in the face of any type of act of the State that may affect them”; that it “is not applicable only to judges and courts”; and that “[t]he guarantees established by this norm must be observed in the different procedures in which State bodies adopt decisions determining a person’s rights, because the State also entrusts the function of adopting decisions that determine rights to administrative, collegiate or single-person authorities.”11 A third alternative interpretation, that complements the preceding one, is the one assumed in this opinion, consisting in nuancing or clarifying the aspects affirmed by the Court and in the above-mentioned dissenting opinion. To this end, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that the rules of interpretation of treaties, which entail the simultaneous application of good faith, the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the treaty in question, their context, and the object and purpose of the treaty,12 make it obligatory not to overlook the relevance of the explicit use of the words “competent, independent and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” in Article 8(1). According to the customary and convention-based rules of interpretation of treaties, it is therefore necessary to consider the use of these terms. The rules of interpretation do not authorize these words to be omitted or, above all, changed, but merely that their meaning and scope be established among the various application alternatives that could arise. In this regard, it is worth recalling that this course was followed in one of the Court’s most recent judgments. The case in which the judgment was delivered consisted in “determining whether the sanction of loss of civil rights imposed on Mr. López Mendoza by a decision of an administrative body – the Comptroller General of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, adopted under the authority granted by law13 - and the consequent impossibility for him to register his candidacy for elected office, was 11 Paras. 116 and 118. 12 Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 13 Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Judgment on merits, reparations and costs, September 1, 2011, Para. 33. 4