could entail the State’s international responsibility under international law, in this case, the Convention. Otherwise, the way the Court proceeded could be mistaken for a “fourth instance.” However, even if it is considered, as in the judgment, that if corresponded to the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal to rule on that matter, it should be recalled that the Court, in order to interpret the right to be heard embodied in Article 8(1) of the Convention resorted, not to a juridical norm created by an autonomous source of international law, but to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, when it stated that “fair proceedings presume that the organ responsible for administering justice conducts ‘a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision.’”51 But, this is precisely what the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal did when it ratified the Bank’s decisions; in other words, it recognized, considered or appreciated the value or merits52 “of the allegations, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties” relating to the decisions of the Bank as “relevant to its decision.” Moreover, and notwithstanding the above, by the judgment that, owing to the ruling the cases mentioned, Article 25(1) of the indirect, insufficient and inadequate way matter in question. it could be considered that the grounds used of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal in Convention has been violated, constitute an of making this provision applicable to the Indeed, the judgment indicates that, since the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal did not analyze the defects that, in some cases, impaired the granting of the consent envisaged in the said article 31, the appeal filed before it was not an “effective remedy,” because, ultimately, it could not protect those prejudiced by the decisions of the Bank that (since the latter had not made the said analysis) violated the substantial sphere of the right “to be heard by an administrative body, for the determination of the rights granted in article 31 of Law 17,613.” Consequently, the judgment finds that, regarding the said cases, Article 25(1) had been violated.53 Since, as stated above, this dissenting opinion considers that Article 8(1) is not applicable to the Bank’s decisions, logically it is unable to agree with the ruling as regards Article 25(1). To the contrary, this opinion considers that, according to the above, that norm was fully applicable to the ruling of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal and, consequently, it was before that instance that the right to be heard stipulated in Article 8(1) should have been exercised in relation to the Bank’s decisions and, if its exercise had been prevented, it would have been possible to file an appeal to safeguard that right before the corresponding instance, under the provisions of Article 25(1). Hence, it can be said that what the Court should have done in relation to the rulings of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal was determine whether or not they conformed to the provisions of Article 8(1) rather than Article 25(1). But, it did not do this and, for the reasons stated, I cannot agree with the decision it took in this regard either. 2. Remedies before ordinary justice a. Facts and/or background information 51 Para. 121. 52 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, op.cit. 53 Para. 220. 13