131. For their part, the representatives indicated that “the Advisory Commission, in a discretionary manner, failed to take into account that the consent of most of the depositors was invalid when it was given.” They added that “[t]he Advisory Commission, by admitting that it was not empowered to consider whether the consent was invalid, […] automatically left all the depositors without protection [contrary to] the spirit of article 31 of Law 17,613.” In addition, they indicated that the Advisory Commission’s actions violated the guarantees of due process because “[t]he depositors ha[d] the right to have [their] problem dealt with integrally and decided within the framework of an impartial Advisory Commission that did not place a limit on its own powers.” 132. Uruguay indicated that the concept of the common good had inspired Law No. 17,613 “and determined the State’s conduct when creating additional mechanisms to those that already existed,” by adding to the existing juridical regime, “an administrative procedure that would provide an additional guarantee to the said petitioners; namely, an administrative body competent to analyze each case by receiving the pertinent evidence and, without the need to resort to the courts, deciding those cases in which it was proved that the legal requirements had been fulfilled.” The State added that “[i]f the interested party did not find the [Advisory] Commission’s decision satisfactory, he continued to have all the guarantees of an independent jurisdiction.” Regarding the reasons why the administrative body had not ruled on the alleged defects of consent and the obligation to inform, Uruguay affirmed that it was not correct to argue that the Advisory Commission had limited its own powers, because “as any public body, its actions were governed by the principle of specialization, and this prevented it from exceeding the mandate established by the legislator”; however, any claim based on another reason could be formulated by the alleged victims through the courts. Considerations of the Court 133. In December 2002, the State promulgated Law 17,613, seeking to respond to different situations that had arisen as a result of the banking crisis that had occurred in Uruguay that year and the imminent liquidation of several private financial intermediation institutions, including the Banco de Montevideo and the Banco La Caja Obrera. Under article 31 of this law, the State created a special administrative procedure to determine the rights of “depositors” of these Banks whose savings “had been transferred to other institutions” “without their consent.” This procedure would function for a certain time exclusively to decide the rights of those in this situation. The Court has already referred to the two rights that would be determined using this procedure (supra para. 126). Consequently, the importance that this special administrative remedy would have in determining the rights of the alleged victims in this case is evident, as well as the significance that the State guarantee that the procedure would be able to satisfy the purpose and the result for which it was conceived. 134. In this regard, the Court has verified that the requirement established in article 31 of Law 17,613, compliance with which was determinant for the petitions to be accepted by the Central Bank, was that the transfers had been carried out “without their consent.” The Court has verified the arguments of the Inter-American Commission and the representatives that the said administrative body, when examining this requirement, decided to examine only the elements from which consent could be inferred, but expressly inhibited itself from examining the arguments and evidence that could prove that the consent that had been verified was defective. In this regard, in some of the decisions submitted to the Court, it is clear that the Board of the Central Bank of Uruguay expressly established that “annulment of the acceptance of the investment and of any contractual responsibility for the unsuccessful operations carried out involving error, fraud or serious negligence, necessarily constitute[d] jurisdictional decisions that exceed[ed] the sphere of the powers granted to the Central Bank of Uruguay under article 31 of Law 17,613” (supra para. 95). In this regard, the testimony of Mr. Durán Martínez, member of the Advisory Commission, reveals that, in exercising its functions 55