occurred; in other words, the existence of possible defects of consent.” According to the representatives, the consent of most of the depositors was invalid when it was given, because “it had been obtained by error or by fraud, both of which were reasons to annul consent under Uruguayan law”. They argued that the evidence required of the alleged victims to prove the absence of consent in the transfer of their funds to offshore accounts “should [have been] reasonable and objective, and should not [have] constitute[d] an obstacle to the transparent implementation of the procedure established for the recovery of their assets.” 152. In this regard, the State explained how the existence or absence of consent was determined in application of article 31 of Law 17,613. It indicated that “the basic norms and principles that regulate any relationship involving a mandate, power of attorney or commission [were applied]: the person exercising the mandate, power of attorney or commission may exercise all the powers that have been conferred on him by the mandate, power of attorney or commission, but may not act against the express instructions of the person granting the mandate, power of attorney or commission, even in the matters covered by the mandate, power of attorney or commission.” The State emphasized that, in the wording of article 31 of Law 17,613, the legislator decided “not to declare, in general, that […] the investors in TCB Cayman should be considered as depositors in those banks upon their liquidation.” According to the State “[t]he legislator was seeking to limit the recognition as depositors of the Banco de Montevideo to those who, being previously depositors in the Banco de Montevideo S.A., did not know, were unaware of and, consequently, had not given their consent for their money to be transferred to TCB Cayman.” It was “immaterial to the legislator that they had not understood the risks of the operation […], or that they had not asked about its legal and financial consequences.” The State explained that article 31 of Law 17,613 “does not require either express or written consent, but merely consent [so that] verbal consent is valid and implied consent is valid.” Considerations of the Court 153. The analysis of the decisions of the Board of the Central Bank and of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal reveals that the requirements of article 31 of Law 17,613 were: (1) to be a “depositor” of the Banco de Montevideo or the Banco La Caja Obrera; (2) whose savings had been transferred to other institutions, and (3) without his consent. 154. Regarding the first requirement, analysis of the documentary, expert and testimonial evidence reveals that the term “depositor” [ahorrista] did not have a legal or objective definition that would allow its standardized application. Regarding its interpretation and application by the Central Bank, when testifying before the Court, a member of the Advisory Commission and the Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank at the time of the facts, explained that this involved having a bank deposit.230 In this regard, commissioner Duran Martínez added that “[c]lassic deposits are: a savings, checking or fixed-term account,” and that, in addition, those with a special account known as on-demand deposits for share trading “were also considered depositors.” Nevertheless, the Court has verified that, in many cases corresponding to the alleged victims, the Central Bank rejected their claims on the basis, inter alia, that the documentation presented by the petitioners did not prove that their savings were placed in the Banco de Montevideo in a checking, fixed-term or savings account,” so that “it was not appropriate to analyze whether or not there had been express consent to the transfer of their savings to another institution when […] the prior existence of a bank 230 Cf. Affidavit of the witness Julio de Brun dated February 16, 2011 (merits file, volume II, folios 1101 and 1105), and testimony of the witness Augusto Durán Martínez during the public hearing in this case. 63