enshrined in the Convention is considered an injured party.280 The victims in this case are: (a) the 539 individuals victims of the violation of the right to be heard with regard to their petitions before the Central Bank (supra paras. 133 to 142); (b) Alicia Barbani Duarte and Jorge Marenales, victims of the violation of the right to non-discriminatory treatment in relation to the right to the procedural guarantee of adequate reasoning in the decision of the Central Bank (supra paras. 183 to 185), and (c) Daniel Dendrinos Saquieres, Fabiana Lijtenstein, Jean Leroy, Martín Guerra, María Ivelice Gigli Rodríguez, Leandro Rama Sienra, Clara Volyvovic, Pablo Raúl Roure Casas, Marta Rodríguez Lois, Ángel Notaro, Alba Bonifacino and Thomas Máximo Neuschul, victims of the violation of the right to judicial protection (supra paras. 218 to 220). C. Measures of reparation 243. International case law and, in particular, that of the Court have established repeatedly that the judgment constitutes per se a form of reparation.281 However, considering the circumstances of the case sub judice and the effects on the victims resulting from the violations of Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention declared to their detriment, the Court finds it pertinent to order the following measures. B.1) Measure of satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition B.1.a) Guarantee of due process and judicial protection in the determination of the rights of the victims 244. The Commission asked the Court to order the State to “take the necessary measures to establish a suitable and effective mechanism so that the victims named in the present case and the other members of the group of more than 1,400 depositors[, whose petitions relating to article 31 of Law 17,613 were rejected by the Central Bank] can have recourse to it and the opportunity to prove whether they meet the criteria that the applicable law establishes to receive the compensation provided for in Law 17,613.” 245. The only reparations requested by the representatives refer to the payment of “compensation” (infra para. 255) and the reimbursement of costs and expenses (infra para. 268). 246. For its part, the State indicated that “there have been suitable and effective mechanisms that were more than sufficient for the individuals identified as victims in the instant case and the other members of the group of more than 1,400 persons[, whose petitions with regard to article 31 of Law 17,613 were rejected by the Central Bank,] to be able to prove whether they met ‘…the criteria of the applicable law to receive the compensation provided for by Law 17,613….’” Thus, according to the State, “it would not be appropriate to adopt any new additional measure.” It added that “even if the Court were to grant measures of satisfaction […], it would still be inadmissible in the instant case to grant any ‘compensation,’ as sought by the Commission.” 247. In this case, the Court has declared the international responsibility of Uruguay for having committed specific violations of due guarantees in the procedure before the Central Bank with regard to the determination of the rights of the victims, as stipulated in article 31 of Law 17,613 (supra paras. 172 and 198), as well as for having violated the right to judicial protection to the detriment of 12 persons. Hence, the Court has not 280 Cf. Case of the La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 215, para. 233; Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, supra note 12, para. 181, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 211. 281 Cf. Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 14, 1996. Series C No. 28, para. 35; Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, supra note 12, para. 227, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 213. 89