DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA Although it has not proved that those responsible acted under official orders or that this was a practice of the Colombian Army and, whereas, from the record one can deduce the opposite (apparently those kidnapping the victims were dressed as guerrillas, although the difference between a military and a guerrilla uniform is not clear; and Captain Forero-Quintero was treated for several months in a military hospital for paranoia resulting from psychological trauma caused by the assassination at the hands of the guerrillas of several members of his troop while they were building a highway), the Court has not found it inappropriate to infer that the death and disappearance of Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del Carmen Santana occurred at the hands of a paramilitary group in collusion with an official and a sub-official of the Army. The undersigned judge understands that, according to modern trends in international law, this could constitute an act of the State, which is not excused by the circumstance that those involved could have acted under their own initiative. The criminal judge who investigated those implicated absolved them because the evidence used to charge them was weak and circumstantial. That judgment, which is a model of analysis, makes one think that, perhaps, condemning the accused would have violated the procedural rights and presumption of innocence required by Colombian law and the Convention. Except for testimony from the same individuals, which did not always coincide with their initial testimony, and the testimony of Gonzalo Arias-Alturo, which also does not agree with his earlier statements, this Court did not have additional evidence beyond that which was considered by that judge. However, here, as the Court has stated (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, paras. 134 and 135; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, paras. 140 and 141), we are dealing with the assumption of international State responsibility for violation of the Convention and not a case of criminal responsibility. Consequently, what must be analyzed is not whether Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del Carmen Santana were killed under the circumstances accepted as a working hypothesis by the Court, which would produce criminal responsibility in those implicated, but whether Colombia has violated the Convention. That is to say, whether conditions exist under which an act which violates a right recognized in the Convention can be attributed or imputed to that State, thereby establishing its international responsibility. (Ibid. para. 160 and para. 169, respectively.) In paragraph 60, the Court cites Advisory Opinion OC14/94 which fully confirms what I say here. (International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, para. 56.) In an earlier case, the Court stated that Article 1(1) is essential in determining whether a violation of the human rights recognized by the Convention can be imputed to a State Party. In effect, that article charges the States Parties with the fundamental duty to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the Convention. Any impairment of those rights, which can be attributed under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, para. 164 and Godínez Cruz Case, para. 173.)