15 logical sequence, with the broad scope of the general guarantee obligation (Article 1(1) of the American Convention) and the obligations erga omnes of protection (paras. 2-13), the genesis, ontology and hermeneutics of Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention (paras. 14-21), the irrelevance of the allegation of difficulties arising from domestic law (paras. 22-23), the right to an effective recourse in the case law of the Inter-American Court (paras. 24-27); then, I examined the indivisibility of access to justice (the right to an effective recourse) and the guarantees of due process of law (Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention) (paras. 28-34), and concluded that this indivisibility, revealed in the consistent case law of the Court to date (paras. 35-43), constituted “the legal heritage of the interAmerican protection system and of the peoples of our region,” so that “I am firmly opposed to any attempt to dismantle it” (para. 33). 46. In my separate opinion the Pueblo Bello Massacre case, I stated that this indivisibility between Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention was an “inviolable advance in case law" (paras. 44-52). 61 I then referred to the right of access to justice lato sensu, observing that: "In the Reports I submitted to the competent organs of the Organization of American States (OAS) when President of the Inter-American Court, e.g., on April 19, 2002, and October 16, 2002, I emphasized my understanding as regards the broad scope of the right of access to justice at the international level; the right of access to justice lato sensu. 62 This right is not reduced to formal access, stricto sensu, to the judicial instance (both domestic and international), but also includes the right to a fair trial and underlies interrelated provisions of the American Convention (such as Articles 25 and 8), in addition to permeating the domestic law of the States Parties. 63 The right of access to justice, with its own juridical content, means, lato sensu, the right to obtain justice. In brief, it becomes the right that justice should be done. One of the main components of this right is precisely direct access to a competent court, by means of an effective, prompt recourse, and the right to be heard promptly by this independent, impartial court, at both the national and international levels (Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention). As I indicated in a recent publication, here we can visualize a true right to law; that is, the right to a national and international legal system that effectively safeguards the fundamental rights of the individual. 64" (paras. 61-62). 47. Finally, in the same separate opinion in the Pueblo Bello Massacre, I reiterated my understanding that the right to law constitutes an “imperative of jus cogens": 61 . In the same separate opinion, I also referred to overcoming the vicissitudes regarding the right to an effective recourse in the development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (paras. 53-59). 62 . Cf. also A.A. Cançado Trindade, "El Derecho de Acceso a la Justicia Internacional y las Condiciones para Su Realización en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos,” 37 Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2003) pp. 53-83; A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Hacia la Consolidación de la Capacidad Jurídica Internacional de los Peticionarios en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos," 37 Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2003), pp. 13-52. 63 . In this regard, cf. E.A. Alkema, "Access to Justice under the ECHR and Judicial Policy - A Netherlands View," in Afmaelisrit pór Vilhjálmsson, Reykjavík, Bókaútgafa Orators, 2000, pp. 21-37. 64 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, tome III, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S.A. Fabris Ed., 2002, chap. XX, p. 524, para. 187.