15 lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, paras. 63-64; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, paras. 66-67; and, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, paras. 87-88.) 64. The Court has also held that, in keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention and in accordance with an interpretation of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, the proper remedy in the case of the forced disappearance of persons would ordinarily be habeas corpus, since those cases require urgent action by the authorities. Consequently, “habeas corpus would be the normal means of finding a person presumably detained by the authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given the case, of obtaining his liberty” (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, supra 63, para. 65; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, supra 63, para. 68; and, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, supra 63, para. 90). 65. In this case it has been proved that María Nodelia Parra-Rodríguez, the common-law wife of Isidro Caballero-Delgado, on February 10, 1989, filed a writ of habeas corpus with the First Superior Judge for the District of Bucaramanga in connection with the disappearance of the victim who, together with a “young lady named CARMEN,” had been unlawfully detained by military authorities. As the here relevant record shows, the Judge not only requested information on the matter from the State institutions where a person could be held in detention for various reasons namely, the Model Prison of that city, the Police Force and the Administrative Security Department (DAS)- but also went personally to the Fifth Brigade, where the petitioner had asserted they were being held. In other words, the Judge, complying with the purposes of the habeas corpus writ, did everything in her power to find the alleged detainees. Since all of these authorities reported that the persons in question were not being held in their facilities and that there were no orders for their arrest or judgments against them, the Judge -on the very same day that the writ had been filed, that is, handling the matter with great speed- declared the proceeding to be unfounded because it had not been proved that Isidro Caballero had been deprived of his liberty. 66. The Court notes that the writ of habeas corpus was filed and decided only on behalf of Isidro Caballero-Delgado and did not cover María del Carmen Santana, despite the fact that in the statement of facts a “young lady named CARMEN” is mentioned. Since the Government did not refer to this matter in its preliminary objections, however, this Tribunal will not consider it. 67. Given that the proceedings before the Commission were initiated on April 5, 1989, with the presentation of the complaint regarding the forced disappearance of Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del Carmen Santana, that is, after the filing of the writ of habeas corpus and the negative decision thereon, this Court considers that the petitioners fulfilled the requirements of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, for they exhausted the domestic remedy that is proper and effective in matters concerning the forced disappearance of persons. All of the remaining domestic proceedings go to the merits of the case, for they relate to the conduct followed by Colombia in complying with its obligation to protect the rights proclaimed in the Convention. 68. In view of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the third objection interposed by the Government is without merit. VIII Now, therefore, THE COURT, unanimously,