-4487. Democratic control by society, through public opinion, fosters transparency in State activities and promotes the accountability of State officials in relation to their public activities.89 Hence, for the individual to be able to exercise democratic control, the State must guarantee access to the information of public interest that it holds. By permitting the exercise of this democratic control, the State encourages greater participation by the individual in the interests of society. B) The restrictions to the exercise of the right of access to State-held information imposed in this case 88. The right of access to State-held information admits restrictions. This Court has already ruled in other cases on the restrictions that may be imposed on the exercise of freedom of thought and expression.90 89. In relation to the requirements with which a restriction in this regard should comply, first, they must have been established by law to ensure that they are not at the discretion of public authorities. Such laws should be enacted “for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been established.” In this respect, the Court has emphasized that: From that perspective, one cannot interpret the word "laws," used in Article 30, as a synonym for just any legal norm, since that would be tantamount to admitting that fundamental rights can be restricted at the sole discretion of governmental authorities with no other formal limitation than that such restrictions be set out in provisions of a general nature. […] The requirement that the laws be enacted for reasons of general interest means they must have been adopted for the "general welfare" (Art. 32(2)), a concept that must be interpreted as an integral element of public order (ordre public) in democratic States […].91 90. Second, the restriction established by law should respond to a purpose allowed by the American Convention. In this respect, Article 13(2) of the Convention permits imposing the restrictions necessary to ensure “respect for the rights or reputations of others” or “the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.” 91. Lastly, the restrictions imposed must be necessary in a democratic society; consequently, they must be intended to satisfy a compelling public interest. If there are various options to achieve this objective, that which least restricts the right protected must be selected. In other words, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and must be appropriate for accomplishing this legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the right.92 89 Cf. . Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 72, para. 83; . Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 72, para. 97; and . Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 72, para. 127. Likewise, cf. Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83, ECHR 2001-VIII; and Surek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, § 60, ECHR Judgment of 8 July, 1999. 90 Cf. Case of López Álvarez, supra note 72, para. 165; . Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 72, para. 85; . Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 72, para. 95; and . Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 72, paras. 120123. 91 92 Cf. Advisory Opinion. OC-6/86, supra note 86, paras. 26-29. Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 72, para. 85; . Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 72, para. 96; . Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 72, paras. 121 and 123; and Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 72, para. 46.