-52obligation implies that the recourse must be appropriate to contest the violation, and that
its implementation by the competent authority must be effective.106
132. In this case, Marcel Claude Reyes, Arturo Longton Guerrero and Sebastián Cox
Urrejola filed an application for protection before the Santiago Court of Appeal on July 27,
1998 (supra para. 57(23)), based, inter alia, on the fact that “the omissive conduct of the
Foreign Investment Committee” affected the constitutional guarantee contained in Article
19(12) (“freedom to issue an opinion and impart information”) of the Constitution, “in
relation to Article 5(2) thereof[107] and Articles 13(1) of the American Convention on
Human Rights and 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
because it constituted an arbitrary omission concerning access to public information,
which was not permitted by law and which prevented the appellants […] from exercising
social control of the body of the State Administration.”
133. The said application for protection is established in Article 20 of the Constitution,
and it can be filed by an individual “on his own behalf, or by another person on his
behalf” before the respective court of appeal, when “owing to arbitrary or illegal acts or
omissions, he suffers denial of, interference with or threat to the legitimate exercise of
the rights and guarantees established in specific subparagraphs of Article 19 of the
Constitution (supra para. 57(24)).
134. When deciding this recourse, the Santiago Court of Appeal failed to decide on the
dispute resulting from the action of the Vice President of the Foreign Investment
Committee by ruling on the existence of the right of access to the requested information
in this specific case, since the judicial decision was to declare that the filed application for
protection was inadmissible (supra para. 57(25)).
135. First, the Court finds that this judicial decision lacked sufficient justification. The
Santiago Court of Appeal merely indicated that it had adopted the decision on the basis
that, “from the facts described […] and from the background information attached to the
application, it is clearly without grounds.” The Court of Appeal also indicated that it
considered that “the purpose of the application for protection is to re-establish the rule of
law when this has been disrupted by arbitrary or illegal acts or omissions that threaten,
interfere with or deny the legitimate exercise of one of the guarantees specifically
included in Article 20 of the Constitution, without prejudice to other legal actions,”
without developing any other conclusions in this regard.
136. The said judicial decision does not contain any justification other than the one
indicated above. The Santiago Court of Appeal did not make even the least reference to
the reasons why it was “evident” from the “facts” and “background information” in the
application that it was “clearly without grounds.” Moreover, it did not asses whether the
action of the administrative authority, by not providing part of the requested information,
related to any of the guarantees that can be the object of the application for protection,
or whether any other recourse before the regular courts would be admissible.
106
Cf. Case of López Álvarez, supra note 72, para. 139; Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 72, para.
184; and Case of Acosta Calderón, supra note 102, para. 93.
Which establishes that “the exercise of sovereignty recognizes as a limitation respect for the
fundamental human rights. It is the obligation of the State to respect and promote these rights, guaranteed by
this Constitution and also by the international treaties ratified by Chile and which are in force.”
107