54. Furthermore, in keeping with the prevailing jurisprudential and normative criteria in the sphere of both international criminal law and comparative criminal law, the Court has found that rape does not necessarily entail non-consensual vaginal sex, as it was traditionally deemed. Rape should also be understood as acts of vaginal or anal penetration, without the consent of the victim, using other parts of the perpetrator’s body or objects, as well as oral penetration by the male organ.129 In this regard, the Court clarifies that, in order for an act to be considered rape, it is sufficient that penetration, however slight, occurs, as described above.130 In addition, it must be understood that vaginal penetration refers to penetration by any part of the perpetrator’s body or by objects of any genital opening, including the labia majora and labia minora, as well as the vaginal orifice. This interpretation is in keeping with the concept that any type of penetration, however slight, is sufficient for an act to be considered rape.131 55. Moreover, “rape may constitute torture even when it is based in a single fact alone and takes place outside State facilities, such as in the victim’s home. This is so because the objective and subjective elements that classify an act as torture do not refer either to the accumulation of facts or to the place where the act is committed, but to the intention, the severity of the suffering, and the purpose of the act.” 132 56. As to the adverse impact on private life in cases of rape, the Commission133 and the Court have stated that that right, enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, includes, among other dimensions, “sexual life and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.”134 The Court found that rape violates essential aspects of private life and negates the “right to decide freely with whom to have intimate relations ... and [about] basic bodily functions.”135 57. As in cases of death in state custody, when victims whom have been deprived of liberty in normal health allege that they have been tortured, “the presumption exists that the State is responsible for any injuries revealed by a person who has been in the custody of State agents [and] the State has the obligation to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of what happened and disprove the arguments concerning its responsibility, with satisfactory probative elements.”136 58. The Court has stated that both the American Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child137 “form part of a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the protection of the child.”138 Under Article 19 of the Convention, children have an added, complementary right, “which the Convention establishes for those who, because of their physical and emotional development, require special protection.” 139 Thus, children have the same human rights that all persons enjoy, as well as special rights by virtue of their status as children,140 considering their particularly vulnerable condition.141 I/A Court H.R., Case of J v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series C. No. 275 (J. Judgment), par. 359, citing Miguel Castro Castro Prison Judgment, par. 310. 130 J. Judgment, par. 359. 131 I/A Court H.R., J. Judgment, par. 359. 132 I/A Court H.R., Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Judgment of August 30, 2010, and Costs, Series C. No. 215 (Fernández Ortega Judgment), par. 128. 133 IACHR, Report 5/96, Case 10.970, Peru, Raquel Martín de Mejía, March 1, 1996. 134 I/A Court H.R., Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of August 31, 2010, Series C. No. 216 (Rosendo Cantú et al. Judgment), par. 119; Fernández Ortega Judgment, par. 129. 135 I/A Court H.R., Rosendo Cantú et al. Judgment, par. 119; Fernández Ortega Judgment, par. 129. 136 I/A Court H.R., Espinoza Gonzáles Judgment, par. 177. 137 Ratified by Bolivia on June 26, 1990. Relevant for the purposes of this section are Articles 37 (a) and (b), the pertinent portions of which provide: “Article 37. States Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. [...] (b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.” 138 I/A Court H.R., Street Children Judgment, par. 194. See also Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC17/02 of August 28, 2002. Series A No. 17 (hereinafter, “Advisory Opinion, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child”), par. 24. 139 I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 2, 2004, Series C. No. 112, par. 147; Case of Servellón García et al.v. Honduras, Judgment of September 21, 2006, Series C. No. 152, par. 113. 140 I/A Court H.R., Advisory Opinion, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, par. 54. 141 I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 24, 2009, Series C No. 211 (Las Dos Erres Massacre Judgment), par. 184. 129 16